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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
1.1 Research on financial stability
The continuing financial crisis starting in 2007 forces policy makers as well as aca-
demics around the world to think about adequate actions to guarantee the proper
functioning of the global financial system. At the latest the collapse of Lehman
brothers in 2008 showed that a globally interconnected financial network can trans-
mit shocks to financial centers all over the world. And recently the emerging Eu-
ropean sovereign debt crisis shows that there is an additional danger of spillover
effects from a sovereign default to the banking system which could serve again (e.g.
through the interbank market) as a shock transmitter to financial institutions all
over the world. As a response to these events happening during the financial crisis,
policy makers as well as academics are working on solutions to make the financial
system more resilient to shocks. Thus, more and more models and methods are de-
veloped to evaluate and improve the stability of the financial system. Additionally,
a great effort is made to develop and implement a new regulatory framework that
mitigates systemic risk.
A comprehensive summary of research on this topic has been provided by the Global
Financial Stability Report of the International Monetary Fund in April 2009.1 In
this report, different approaches to measure systemic risk due to the existence of
financial interlinkages are presented: One of these approaches is the Co-Risk anal-
ysis developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). This approach uses publicly
available market equity data as well as balance sheet data of financial institutions
to measure the Value at Risk (VaR) of one institution in distress conditional on an-
other institution (or the whole financial system) being in distress. This “Conditional
Value at Risk” (or CoVaR) can be calculated by using quantile regressions. Another
approach introduced by the International Monetary Fund (2009) is the distress de-
pendence matrix developed by Segoviano and Goodhart (2009). They generate a
1 See International Monetary Fund (2009), Chapter 2
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multivariate distribution describing implied asset price movements of different in-
stitutions. From this multivariate distribution, pairwise conditional probabilities
of distress can be derived. Thus, it is possible to calculate the probability of one
institution falling into distress conditional on the probability of another institution
being in distress.
These approaches use market data of financial institutions. This makes it possible
to assess systemic risk due to direct and indirect exposures between financial institu-
tions, as co-movements of risk should be, under the assumption of market efficiency,
captured by co-movements of the respective indicators (like equity returns or CDS
spreads). An additional advantage of market data is that they are publicly avail-
able, usually at a high frequency. As a result, various studies have been developed
recently that exploit the information inherent in market data to evaluate systemic
risk in financial systems. Another paper that uses market data for the analysis of
financial stability is Acharya et al. (2010). In this study, the authors use equity
return as well as CDS data to estimate the relationship between banks’ losses in
times of severe distress compared to moderately bad days. The European Central
Bank provides a summary and brief discussion of these and other studies that try
to quantify systemic risk in a special feature of its Financial Stability Review of
December 2010.2 However, one drawback of the approach using market data is that
markets are not efficient - especially not in times of distress. Market participants
tend to overreact in crisis times and underestimate risk in tranquil times. Addition-
ally, the anticipation of a government bail-out for institutions that are considered
as too big to fail may lead to an incorrect evaluation of the true risk inherent in
certain financial institutions.
Another approach mentioned in the Global Financial Stability Report of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (2009) considers the financial system as an intercon-
nected network of financial institutions. This approach usually does not rely on
2 See European Central Bank (2010a), pp. 147-153
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market data, but on detailed information about mutual interbank exposures. Of
course, this approach faces some problems of data availability, especially on an in-
ternational level. Additionally, there is usually only a focus on direct interlinkages
between banks. However, an advantage of this approach is, that results can be
clearly assigned to one specific channel of shock transmission and that it normally
uses quite reliable data. In this modeling approach, the financial system can be
seen as a directed graph with financial institutions being the nodes (or vertices)
and exposures between these institutions being the edges (or arcs). Within this
so-called network approach techniques originated within the theory of complex net-
works can be used. These techniques are already widely applied to other disciplines
like physics, computer science or sociology. In this context, a special feature in the
June 2010 Financial Stability Review of the European Central Bank3 as well as Hal-
dane and May (2011) provide an introduction how the theory of complex networks
can be applied to analyze the stability of financial systems.
1.2 Summary and contribution
Chapter 2 of this thesis is a contribution to the growing literature on financial net-
works. It is based on the paper “Completeness, interconnectedness and distribution
of interbank exposures - a parameterized analysis of the stability of financial net-
works”.4 In this chapter, the stability of a stylized financial system dependent on
certain characteristics is evaluated. Whereas existing empirical literature on this
topic has its focus on one particular network, theoretical (simulation as well as
model-based) literature on this topic concentrates on the effect of the completeness
and interconnectedness of the network on financial stability. This chapter extends
the existing literature on theoretical network analysis by one parameter: the degree
3 See European Central Bank (2010b), pp. 155-160
4 See Sachs (2010)
4
of equality of the distribution of interbank exposures (measured by entropy).
In this chapter, a financial system is characterized by the total number of banks, the
total number of assets in the system, the share of interbank assets to total assets
and the banks’ equity ratio. Furthermore, three network structures are investigated:
a complete network, where a directed link between each financial institution exists, a
random graph, which denotes a usually incomplete network, where (in this case ho-
mogeneous) banks form their links randomly, and a so-called money center system,
which consists of large and strongly interconnected core banks as well as smaller
banks in the periphery that are linked to exactly one core bank. The crucial com-
ponent for the simulations is the matrix of interbank exposures. For given row and
column sums of the matrix, which are exogenously given by the parameters men-
tioned above, a large number of valid matrices of interbank exposures is generated
by simulation. These matrices are then characterized by the degree of equality how
the exposures are distributed.
After creating these matrices for a given financial system, domino effects are sim-
ulated. Thus, it is investigated what happens if one bank fails for some exogenous
reason. If losses on the exposures to the failed bank exceed the creditor banks’
capital, the creditor banks also fail.5 Several rounds of this contagion mechanism
could occur leading to a whole cascade of bank failures. One important component
in the contagion analysis is the loss given default (LGD), i.e. the share of the total
exposure to the failing bank that is actually lost and leads to write-downs on the
creditor banks’ equity. To keep the contagion analysis as simple as possible and to
be able to exclusively focus on the impact of the structure of the matrix of interbank
exposures, I assume a constant LGD within this chapter.6
5 Note that Chapter 2 does not deal with the existence of any regulatory minimum capital
ratios. Thus, I assume that a bank can operate properly as long as it has positive capital.
The following Chapters 3 and 4 will take a minimum capital ratio into account.
6 In Chapter 3 and 4 that contain an empirical analysis of the stability of the German banking
system, this assumption is not applied any more. Instead, a whole distribution of loss given
default is used for simulations.
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The first simulation exercise deals with a complete network and not too extreme
parameter values (i.e. very low equity ratios or very high LGDs). The first result
is that a more equal distribution of exposures leads to a more stable system as ex-
posures are better diversified among counterparties. In a next step, this analysis is
extended to a random graph. Looking at the average number of bank defaults for
a given connectivity (i.e. a given probability that a certain link exists), the results
of the theoretical model of Allen and Gale (2000), i.e. the non-monotonic relation-
ship between the completeness of the network and its stability, can be confirmed by
simulation. If, however, the distribution of interbank exposures is additionally con-
sidered, some deviant results can be shown. Thus, the second result of this chapter
is that financial stability does not only depend on the completeness and intercon-
nectedness of the network, but also on the degree of equality how the exposures are
distributed. Furthermore, two key parameters, the equity ratio and the loss given
default, are varied. It turns out that for parameter values that yield a very unstable
system (i.e. a very low equity ratio and a very high LGD) a more unequal distri-
bution of interbank exposures leads to a more stable system. Thus, in this case, an
equal distribution of exposures helps to spread the initial shock all over the system.
The next simulation exercise deals with money center models. Not surprisingly, the
more concentrated assets are in the core of the system, the more unstable it is. The
last simulation exercise in this chapter deals with a comparison of the stability of
money center systems to the stability of random graphs. On the reasonable assump-
tion that exposures among core banks are at least as large as exposures from core
to periphery banks, a money center system is less stable compared to a network of
homogeneous banks that form their links randomly.
To be able to analyze the influence of specific parameters like the structure of the
matrix of interbank exposures, banks’ capitalization or the loss given default, the
theoretical simulations in Chapter 2 use a highly simplified structure of a banking
system. Real world banking systems are, of course, much more complex, in particu-
6
lar in terms of the system size and the heterogeneity of the banks. Chapter 3 and 4
of this thesis focus on a real-world banking system and investigate its stability using
actually realized supervisory data. To be more precise, we analyze the stability of
the German banking system using detailed information on interbank exposures as
well as data on actually realized loss given default in the interbank market.
Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Christoph Memmel and Ingrid Stein (Deutsche
Bundesbank) and provides a revised version of the paper “Contagion at the In-
terbank Market with Stochastic LGD”.7 The main emphasis of this chapter is on
modeling the loss given default. Our dataset shows that the empirical frequency
distribution of the loss given default is markedly u-shaped, i.e. in most of the cases
the LGD is either very low (e.g. due to good collateralization) or very high. This
u-shaped pattern is found for different subsamples concerning the type and the size
of the banks. A suitable approximation for our u-shaped LGD distribution can be
derived by using a beta distribution with parameters being less than one. Existing
empirical literature on interbank contagion mostly uses an exogenously given con-
stant LGD for simulations and then derives results dependent on the specification of
the LGD. However, as we have a whole distribution of interbank loss given defaults
available, it is possible to run our simulations on the assumption of a stochastic
LGD. Thus, we repeatedly simulate the failure of one particular bank, each time
drawing a set of LGD values from the estimated beta distribution. This exercise is
repeated for each bank in our sample. Contrary to the case of a constant LGD, where
only one number of bank defaults is obtained, our simulation method yields a whole
distribution of bank failures and therefore makes it possible to distinguish between
different scenarios. In our simulations that use on- and off-balance sheet exposure
data of German banks in the fourth quarter of 2010, we find that contagion in the
German interbank market may happen. Furthermore, we find that off-balance sheet
7 See Memmel et al. (2011)
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exposures considerably contribute to systemic risk and that netting (if enforceable)
could be a potential solution to the problem of direct interbank contagion.
Chapter 4 builds on Chapter 3 and is based on the paper “Contagion in the Inter-
bank Market and its Determinants”, which is a joint work with Christoph Memmel.8
In this chapter, the analysis of contagion within the German banking system is ex-
tended to a whole time period (from the first quarter of 2008 to the second quarter
of 2011). Thus, we run the contagion analysis already applied in Chapter 3 for each
quarter within the time period under consideration. The result of this exercise is
that the system becomes less vulnerable to direct interbank contagion over time.
To investigate the impact of our assumption of a stochastic LGD, we run the same
simulations again, but this time by assuming a constant LGD which equals the mean
of our LGD-dataset. We find that the effect of our assumption of a stochastic LGD
depends on the overall stability of the financial system. The assumption of a con-
stant LGD leads to an overestimation of the number of bank failures if the system is
rather unstable, as it is not taken into account that parts of the interbank exposures
have a high recovery rate (i.e. a low loss given default). In contrast, if the system is
rather stable, the assumption of a constant LGD leads to an underestimation of the
number of bank failures, as it is possible that some key exposures have a very low
recovery rate (i.e. a high loss given default). Thus, we conclude that it is important
to take into account the distribution of the LGD when running a contagion analysis.
Simulating by averaging out the LGD can lead to an over- or underestimation of
the stability of the financial system, respectively.
As we run stochastic simulations, we obtain a whole distribution of bank failures as
a result. To be able to compare the distributions of bank failures for different points
in time, we use the concept of stochastic dominance. However, to implement further
analysis it is desirable to condense the information of the whole distribution into
8 See Memmel and Sachs (2011)
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one indicator. By estimating a logit model, we show that it is possible to predict the
probability of a dominance relationship by the absolute difference in the expected
number of bank defaults. Thus, most of the information can be condensed into one
indicator, which is the expected number of bank defaults. This result simplifies the
investigation of the main determinants of financial stability. Following the theoret-
ical literature on interbank contagion (e.g. the simulation analysis in Chapter 2),
we estimate the impact of the following determinants: the banks’ capitalization,
their interbank lending, the mean of the beta distribution of the loss given default
and as a really systemic measure, the degree of equality how banks spread their
exposures (measured by entropy). Thus, we quantify the impact of the different
determinants of system stability. Additionally, we can confirm the results of the
theoretical simulations in Chapter 2 that a higher equity ratio, a lower amount of
interbank lending, a lower average loss given default and a more equal distribution
of interbank exposures leads to a more stable system.
Hence, some implications for the optimal design of a stable financial network can be
derived out of the following chapters. First, a rather equal distribution of interbank
exposures and thus a careful risk diversification makes the system more resilient to
an exogenous shock as long as banks are not too weak to absorb shocks (e.g. due to
a very low capitalization). Additionally, a centralized banking system with few large
banks in the core and many small banks that are linked to these few large banks
bears the risk that the failure of one large bank is a threat to all remaining banks
in the system. A decentralized system with banks of rather equal size naturally
allows more opportunities of risk diversification leading to a more stable system.
Not surprisingly, a better capitalization of banks (which is already included in the
Basel III framework) and a lower amount of interbank lending decrease the danger
of direct interbank contagion. This leads to the conclusion that a higher reliance on
wholesale funding by banks reduces the stability of the financial system. Another
9
important implication can be drawn for the detection of systemic risk. In the fol-
lowing chapters, it is shown that simulations of direct contagion on the interbank
market are remarkably influenced by assumptions concerning parameters like the
loss given default. Thus, it is desirable to take into account a more realistic model-
ing approach of the loss given default by using a u-shaped frequency distribution.
During recent years, a great effort has already been made to enhance the resilience
of the financial system to certain shocks. Part of these efforts comprise the devel-
opment of the Basel III regulatory framework that is, among other things, designed
to improve banks’ capital and liquidity endowment. Furthermore, institutions like
the European Systemic Risk Board (responsible for the European Union) or the Fi-
nancial Stability Oversight Council (responsible for the United States) were created
to improve macroprudential surveillance and detect systemic risk.9 But, as often
stated among policy makers and academics, a lot of research still has to be done in
order to sufficiently understand various channels that influence financial stability.
This thesis constitutes a quantitative contribution to this research partially using
real data.
9 For a description of their tasks and possibilities of action see International Monetary Fund
(2011), Chapter 3, pp. 3-5
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Chapter 2
A parameterized analysis of the
stability of financial networks
11
2.1 Introduction
Research on financial stability is an important topic in order to assess certain risks
and dangers within financial systems that potentially lead to huge losses for the
overall economy. Especially the investigation of various channels of interbank con-
tagion has been in the focus of recent research. This is also the aim of this chapter.
In this context, interbank contagion means that the failure of one financial insti-
tution leads to the failure of other financial institutions. To be more precise, this
chapter examines pure domino effects between banks. Thus, it is investigated what
happens if one bank fails and therefore a part of other banks’ claims to that bank
also fail. It is then possible that creditor banks lose all their capital and therefore
fail as well. In the worst case, there are subsequent rounds of failures until the
whole system defaults. Of course, this is just one channel through which interbank
contagion can occur. Further channels can be contagion due to liquidity problems
because of correlated asset portfolios among banks, contagion due to refinancing
problems affecting banks or contagion due to information spillovers. As a starting
point, however, to be able to exclusively focus on the effect of the structure of the
liability matrix on the stability of the financial network, only domino effects are
considered.
The main contributions of this chapter are, first, that there is an explicit investi-
gation of the impact of the structure of the matrix of interbank liabilities on the
stability of the interbank network. In this context, for given balance sheets of a hy-
pothetical banking system, a large number of valid matrices of interbank exposures
is created and characterized by the degree of equality of the distribution of exposures
(measured by entropy). Second, this chapter examines, how the impact of the struc-
ture of the matrix of interbank exposures on the stability of the financial system
interacts with other parameters like banks’ capitalization or the loss given default.
Third, this chapter provides a comparison of the stability of the financial system
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between different network topologies like a complete network, a random graph and
a money center system with a core-periphery structure.
The main results are, first, that not only the topology of the network (e.g. its
completeness and interconnectedness) determines its stability but also how equally
interbank exposures are distributed. The second result is that the sign of the corre-
lation between the degree of equality of the distribution of interbank exposures and
the average number of bank failures depends on the number of interbank links within
the financial system as well as on banks’ equity ratio and the loss given default. Ad-
ditionally, by assuming reasonable parameter values concerning the amount of bi-
lateral interbank exposures, money center systems with asset concentration among
core banks are more unstable than networks with banks of homogeneous size that
form their links randomly.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives an overview on the related
literature as well as this chapters’ main contributions to this literature. In Section
2.3 the basic structure of the financial system is defined. Section 2.4 explains in more
detail how interbank liability matrices are created and characterized. Simulations
of domino effects are run and results are presented in Section 2.5 which is divided
into the investigation of complete networks (Section 2.5.1), random graphs (Section
2.5.2) and money center models (Section 2.5.3). Section 2.6 summarizes the main
findings.
2.2 Literature
Various fields of studies have been developed to capture the numerous facets of this
comprehensive topic (for a literature survey, see Allen and Babus (2009)). From the
theoretical point of view, Allen and Gale (2000) show that interbank connections can
be useful in order to provide an insurance against liquidity shocks. Because of these
interbank linkages, however, the bankruptcy of one bank can lead to the bankruptcy
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of other banks. In this context, Allen and Gale show that a financial system with a
complete network structure is less prone to contagion than a financial system with
an incomplete network structure. In addition, they state that a disconnected system
is useful to limit contagion. Freixas et al. (2000) implement, among other things,
a theoretical analysis of contagion within a “money center system”, where banks in
the “periphery” are linked to one “core bank” but not to each other. They show
that there are parameter constellations under which the failure of a periphery bank
does not lead to contagion, whereas the failure of the “core bank” does.
Another part of the literature that investigates financial stability are empirical stud-
ies that use supervisory data to analyze the danger of domino effects within a bank-
ing system (for example van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006), Upper and Worms (2004),
Wells (2004), Furfine (2003), Sheldon and Maurer (1998)). As a lot of detailed data
on interbank exposures are necessary but often not available, assumptions such
as maximum entropy are made concerning the structure of these exposures. This
means that banks are assumed to spread their interbank claims as equally as pos-
sible among their counterparties. However, it is likely that, under the maximum
entropy assumption, results are biased. In his summary of the analysis of interbank
contagion, Upper (2007) states that maximum entropy assumptions tend to under-
estimate the incidence but overestimate the severity of contagion. Mistrulli (2011)
investigates interbank contagion using actual Italian interbank data and compares
his findings with an analysis using the maximum entropy assumption. He finds
that, for most parameter constellations, the maximum entropy assumption tends to
underestimate the extent of contagion. There are, however, also some parameter
constellations (in particular a high loss given default) where the maximum entropy
assumption overestimates the scope of contagion.
Cifuentes et al. (2005) extend a contagion model of domino effects by simulations
that include contagion due to liquidity problems. Within their simulations they use
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a clearing algorithm developed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001).10 Liquidity effects are
considered in a similar way in the network model of Bluhm and Krahnen (2011).
Furthermore, the analysis of pure domino effects is extended by Chan-Lau (2010)
and Espinosa-Vega and Solé (2010) by additionally considering contagion due to
banks’ refinancing problems and due to risk transfers stemming from off-balance
sheet exposures. Also, the impact of market and funding liquidity risk on the sta-
bility of a financial network is investigated by Aikman et al. (2009).
In recent years there has been a growing literature which uses theory of complex net-
works to describe real-world financial systems and simulate the effects of potentially
dangerous events. For example, Boss et al. (2004) analyze the network topology of
the Austrian interbank market. Iori et al. (2008) apply network theory to describe
the Italian overnight money market. Haldane (2009) provides a characterization
of the world’s financial network. Georg (2011) models a financial system including
liquidity provision by the central bank and investigates the effect of the structure of
the network (e.g. a small-world network and a scale-free network) on its stability.
Additionally, Gai and Kapadia (2010), as well as Nier et al. (2007), use random
graphs to analyze the danger of contagion dependent on certain characteristics of
the financial system by simulation. Gai and Kapadia (2010) find that for a high
connectivity of the network, the probability that contagion occurs is low but the
impact if contagion occurs can be high. Nier et al. (2007) find out by parameter-
ized simulation some non-linearities between certain parameter values and financial
stability. Contrary to most of the empirical literature, where one special financial
system is considered to test the danger of contagion, simulation-based work instead
tries to find out the main characteristics that make a financial system especially
vulnerable to contagion.
As, up to now, only few studies exist about the detailed structure of real-world finan-
10 Eisenberg and Noe showed that under mild regularity conditions (strong connectivity and at
least one node has positive equity value or all nodes have positive operating cash flows) there
exists a unique fixed point that describes the clearing payment vector of the financial system.
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cial networks, this chapter considers several stylized structures and investigates their
impact on financial stability by simulation. This chapter builds on the empirical lit-
erature that uses entropy methods to construct and characterize interbank linkages
as well as on literature that tries to simulate the danger of contagion according to
certain characteristics of the financial system, in particular the matrix of interbank
exposures. For example, it extends the work of Mistrulli (2011) in such a way that
not only one matrix is compared to the maximum entropy solution but a great
variety of randomly generated matrices with different network structures. A new
approach in this chapter is that a large set of valid interbank matrices is constructed
by a random generator and then characterized according to certain properties, such
as entropy, relative entropy to the maximum entropy solution or connectivity.
Additionally, this chapter differs from Nier et al. (2007) in the sense that, first, bal-
ance sheets are constructed and, as a second step, the liability matrix is generated,
which is, besides row and column sums of the matrix, independent from banks’ bal-
ance sheets. Thus, stability results obtained in this chapter can be attributed purely
to changes in the liability matrix.
Furthermore, results can be interpreted as an extension to the theoretical litera-
ture about the impact of certain network patterns on contagion. Up to now the
focus has been exclusively on the completeness and interconnectedness of interbank
networks (see Allen and Gale (2000)). In this context, banks are modeled as com-
pletely homogeneous, especially with all interbank exposures being the same size.
This work, however, investigates a large number of possible matrices with various
possible specifications of interbank exposures and can thus have an additional focus
on the distribution of claims within the network for given completeness and intercon-
nectedness. Results of this chapter show that the distribution of interbank claims
within the network is an important parameter affecting the stability of the network.
16
2.3 Structure of the financial system
The financial system is modeled as a network of N nodes where nodes 1 to N−1 are
financial institutions (referred to as banks in the following) and node N constitutes
the external (non-banking) sector (such as households or non-financial companies).
These nodes are linked by directed edges that depict direct claims/obligations be-
tween the financial institutions and the external sector. For some of the subsequent
financial networks modeled, it is assumed that there are two different types of banks,
core banks and periphery banks, that are equal within their groups but differ across
groups with regard to their connectivity and size, respectively. The distribution of
assets among the two types of banks is given by a concentration ratio CR, that
denotes the share of total bank assets that core banks hold.
Bank i’s balance sheet has the following structure:
AIBi + AEi = LIBi + LEi + Ei (2.1)
∀ i ε {1, ..., N − 1}.
Interbank assets AIBi (liabilities LIBi ) are claims (obligations) between banks. Ex-
ternal assets AEi are interpreted as credit to the external sector. External liabilities
LEi denote obligations of banks to the external sector such as customer deposits.
The balance sheet is completed by equity Ei that is given by the difference of bank
i’s total assets Ai (= AIBi + AEi ) and liabilities Li (= LIBi + LEi ).
The (risk unweighted) equity ratio, which is presumed to be equal across banks, is
given by:11
r = Ei
AIBi + AEi
(2.2)
11 More general models including banks with heterogeneous equity ratios can be implemented
in a straightforward way.
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∀ i ε {1, ..., N − 1}.
The financial system is characterized by the total amount of banks’ assets Abanks,
as well as the total amount of banks’ interbank assets AIB. The ratio of interbank
to total assets in the financial system is defined as:
φ = A
IB
Abanks
(2.3)
Bank i’s total assets, total liabilities and equity of this stylized financial system can
be perfectly described by the total amount of banks’ assets Abanks, the total number
of banks N − 1, the number of core banks ncore, the concentration ratio CR and
banks’ equity ratio r.
The direct connections between the nodes can be illustrated by a liability matrix:
L =

A1 A2 . . . AN−1 AN
L1 0 L1,2 . . . L1,N−1 L1,N
L2 L2,1 0 . . . L2,N−1 L2,N
... ... ... ... ... ...
LN−1 LN−1,1 LN−1,2 . . . 0 LN−1,N
LN LN,1 LN,2 . . . LN,N−1 0

with Li,j being the obligation of bank i to bank j (i, j ε {1, ..., N − 1}). Because
banks and the external sector do not lend to themselves, Li,i = 0 ∀ i ε {1, .., N}.
Additionally, as banks are linked on both sides of their balance sheets, it is easy
to interpret row sums (= total liabilities) and column sums (= total assets) of the
matrix. The elements of the last row, LN,i (∀ i ε {1, .., N − 1}), are equal to banks’
external assets AEi . Thus, the sum of the elements in the last row of the matrix is
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equivalent to banks’ total external assets, which are given by (1 − φ) · Abanks. The
elements of the last column, Li,N (∀ i ε {1, .., N − 1}), are equal to banks’ external
liabilities LEi . Hence, the sum of the elements in the last column of the matrix (AN)
is equivalent to the total amount of external liabilities of banks. Furthermore, it
is assumed that the system is closed, i.e. there is no lending / borrowing to some-
where outside the network. Technically, this means that the sum of row sums of the
liability matrix has to be equal to the sum of column sums. Thus, total external
liabilities of banks (or total assets of the external sector AN) can be calculated by
the difference between total liabilities in the system (the external sector included)
and total assets of banks.12
2.4 Creation and characterization of liability ma-
trices
Regulators often face the problem of limited data. Sometimes only the row sums
and column sums of the liability matrix are observable. At least it is quite common
for some elements of the liability matrix to be missing. As already mentioned,
this problem is often surrounded by using the assumption that banks spread their
exposures as evenly as possible, which is equivalent to maximizing the entropy of
the (normalized) liability matrix.13 However, using matrices under the maximum
entropy assumption tends to bias the results.
The approach of this chapter is to abstract from generating only one matrix using
the maximum entropy assumption but to create, for given row and column sums,
a large number of valid liability matrices by a random generator. This is done in
12 In the aggregate AN , it is not considered that the external sector might be the owner of the
banks. Thus, AN only comprises the amount of banks’ liabilities that is provided by the
external sector.
13 For the calculation of the maximum entropy solution of a matrix with given row and column
sums, see Appendix 1.
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two steps: first, a random number Lrandij , that does not exceed the number of total
liabilities in the system Ltotal (or total assets in the system Atotal, respectively), is
assigned to each off-diagonal element. This random number is drawn from a uniform
distribution with Lrandij ε
[
0, Ltotal
]
, ∀ i 6= j, where RSgoal(i) is the aspired row
sum and CSgoal(j) is the aspired column sum associated to this element. The
interval the random number is drawn from seems at first more restrictive than
it is. A reduction/expansion of the interval of the uniform distribution to some
smaller/higher upper bound does not change the simulation results. To make the
matrix fit exactly, the RAS algorithm is applied:14 In a first step, each element of
the matrix is multiplied by the ratio of the aspired row sum (RSgoal(i)) and the
actual row sum (rs(i)).
Lij = Lij ·
RSgoal(i)
rs(i) (2.4)
In a second step, each element of the matrix is multiplied by the ratio of the aspired
column sum (CSgoal(j)) and the actual column sum (cs(j)).
Lij = Lij ·
CSgoal(j)
cs(j) (2.5)
By repeating these two steps sufficiently often, a matrix with elements that fit to
the aspired row and column sums will be generated.
The RAS algorithm shows some interesting features. First, restrictions to connec-
tivity can be imposed by setting certain elements equal to zero. These elements
will remain zero after running the algorithm. Second, given certain random starting
values within the matrix, the RAS algorithm yields a unique solution, independent
of the “position” of a certain bank within the matrix. The algorithm is also robust
to a transposition of the matrix. Third, the randomly generated starting values
determine a certain correlation structure within the matrix. The RAS algorithm
determines a unique solution that matches the given correlation structure as well as
14 For a detailed description of the RAS algorithm, see Blien and Graef (1991).
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possible and that fulfills row and column sum restrictions. However, there are cases
where the RAS algorithm does not provide a valid solution. This happens especially
when too many zero restrictions are imposed. Within the simulations, randomly
generated matrices that do not fit are dropped.
After liability matrices are generated, they have to be characterized. As the aim
of this chapter is to investigate the stability of the financial system dependent on
the matrix of interbank exposures, the focus is, for the following characterizations,
on the (N − 1 × N − 1) matrix that covers the interbank market. It is created by
deleting the last row and the last column of the (N ×N) liability matrix L.15 As a
next step, there has to be some normalization of matrices because entropy measures
have to be applied on probability fields. This is done by dividing all elements by the
total amount of interbank liabilities or interbank assets, respectively. As a result,
the elements of the normalized matrices add up to 1 and thus can be treated as
probabilities. In the following, all normalized elements are marked with a super-
script p and are written in lower case letters.
After normalization, the next step is to characterize matrices according to the fol-
lowing measures:
• Entropy: In information theory, entropy is a measure for information and
can, for example, be explained in the context of search problems. To be more
precise, entropy is a lower bound of the average path length from the root
to the leaves of a binary search tree. Thus, entropy is a lower bound to the
average number of yes/no questions that is needed to obtain full information.
The more equal the probability distribution of the elements in the search space,
the more questions are on average needed to obtain the desired element and,
hence, the higher entropy is. The more unequal the probability distribution,
15 As the sum of banks’ interbank assets has to be equal to banks’ interbank liabilities, the sum
of row sums of the (N − 1×N − 1) matrix is still equal to the sum of column sums.
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the lower entropy is. The lowest entropy (equal to zero) can be obtained
when one element in the search space occurs with probability 1 and the other
elements with probability 0, i.e. the most unequal distribution of elements
occurs.
This entropy measure can be reinterpreted to quantify the inequality of the
distribution of claims of a liability matrix. Using the normalization mentioned
above, the elements of the matrix can be seen as realizations of a probability
distribution of elements within a search space that need not be defined more
specifically. Entropy measures the amount of information inherent in these
realizations and is maximal if banks spread their claims / obligations as equally
as possible. The higher the entropy, the more equally interbank claims are
distributed for given row and column sums. The entropy is calculated by:16
ENT = −
N−1∑
i=1
N−1∑
j=1
lpij · ln
(
lpij
)
(2.6)
with 0 · ln(0) := 0.
• Relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler divergence) to maximum entropy
solution: The relative entropy is a measure for the difference between two
probability distributions. Given two normalized liability matrices Xp (in this
case the maximum entropy solution X∗, see Appendix 1, with last row and last
column deleted and normalized by the total amount of interbank liabilities)
and Lp (in this case a valid normalized liability matrix generated by random
generator), the relative entropy is given by:
RE =
N−1∑
i=1
N−1∑
j=1
lpijln
(
lpij
xpij
)
(2.7)
16 When applying the entropy measure in the context of binary search trees, log2 is used. How-
ever, in economics literature it is more common to use the natural logarithm. This is equivalent
to multiplying a constant factor.
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with 0 · ln(0) := 0 and 0 · ln(00) := 0.
A higher value of RE denotes a greater difference between the two distribu-
tions. In the financial system modeled here, a higher relative entropy means
a greater distance to the probability distribution of the maximum entropy so-
lution and thus a more unequal distribution of claims among banks. As long
as the relative entropy to the maximum entropy solution is considered and
banks are assumed to be of equal size, there is a negative linear relationship
between the entropy of a matrix and its relative entropy to the maximum
entropy solution.17
• Connectivity: The connectivity of the financial system can be described by
the probability that a directed link between two banks exists. While construct-
ing the liability matrix of a random graph, each off-diagonal interbank element
is (independently) given a certain positive real number with probability p and
0 with probability 1− p. This probability p is called Erdös-Rényi probability.
However, during implementation one has to be careful that, for given starting
values (including zeros with a certain probability), the RAS algorithm is able
to find a valid solution of matrix entries. This problem increases with decreas-
ing connectivity. The algorithm used in this chapter simply drops matrices
that are not valid.
17 The general derivation of this linear relationship is provided in Appendix 2. Simulation results
confirm this theoretical finding.
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2.5 Simulation of domino effects
Within these simulations, pure domino effects are modeled dependent on charac-
teristics of the interbank liability structure.18 As a trigger event, one bank fails.19
Assuming a certain loss given default (LGD), creditor banks lose a share of their
claims to the defaulting bank.20 If this lost share is larger than the creditor bank’s
equity, the creditor bank also fails. If one or more banks fail due to the first failure,
the next round starts with banks losing additional shares of their claims to failing
banks. Thus, a bank fails if:
∑Interbank exposures to failed banks ∗ LGD > Equity
For a large number of randomly generated matrices, it is investigated how many
banks fail on average, after the failure of one bank, dependent on the characteristics
of the liability matrix mentioned in Section 2.4. To be more precise, it is calculated
which percentage of total assets of the banking system belongs to failing banks, i.e.
which percentage of total bank assets is affected by bank failure.21 Note, however,
that this does not mean that all assets affected by bank failure actually default.
The amount of assets that actually default depends on the value of the loss given
default.
To depict the results graphically, value intervals of characteristics have to be de-
fined. One possibility to do this is to adjust interval size according to the number
of observations. After the random generation of matrices, they are sorted according
18 For advantages and disadvantages of modeling domino effects, see Upper (2007).
19 This is a rather simple way to model a shock on the financial system. A more sophisticated
approach is, for example, used by Elsinger et al. (2006), who apply aggregate macroeconomic
shocks to test for the resilience of the Austrian interbank market.
20 In this chapter, a constant, exogenously given LGD is assumed. An obvious extension is to
endogenize the LGD as, for example, in Degryse and Nguyen (2007).
21 An alternative target value to measure the harm of interbank contagion is the loss of the
external sector, which can be computed easily within this model.
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to their characterization values, and then intervals are defined with each interval
having the same number of observations.
The network simulations are run several times and for different banks failing first to
check how robust these results are with respect to sample changes and to changes
in the trigger event.
2.5.1 Complete networks
To begin with, simulations are run for complete networks, i.e. it is assumed that
there exists a directed link from each node to all other nodes. The parameter values
used for subsequent simulations are Abanks = 1.000, N = 11, ncore = 10, CR = 1
(i.e. all banks are the same size), φ = 0.3, r = 0.06 and LGD = 0.5. The following
figures show, for 50, 000 randomly generated matrices of interbank exposures, the
average percentage of total assets of the banking system affected by bank failures in
a network with 11 nodes (10 banks and the external sector) dependent on entropy
(Figure 2.1) and relative entropy to the maximum entropy solution (Figure 2.2),
each color representing a randomly generated sample.
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Figure 2.1: Stability of a complete network dependent on entropy
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From Figure 2.1 it can be seen that an increase in entropy leads to a lower average
percentage of banks’ assets affected. On the assumption that all banks are of equal
size, the average number of bank defaults dependent on entropy can be derived eas-
ily by multiplying the average percentage of banks’ assets affected by failure by the
total number of banks (in this case, 10). Hence, the more equally banks spread their
claims, the fewer institutions default on average. These results suggest that, within
a complete network and for the parameter values given above, shocks are absorbed
best if banks diversify their (credit) risk exposures well. The results, as well as all
subsequent simulation results, are robust to changes in the sample and to changes
in the bank that fails first.
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Figure 2.2: Stability of a complete network dependent on relative entropy
Figure 2.2, which shows the relation between relative entropy to the maximum en-
tropy solution and average percentage of banks’ assets affected, yields the inverse
result compared to Figure 2.1: The higher the relative entropy, the higher the per-
centage of banks’ assets affected and therefore the higher the average number of
bank failures. Thus, because of the negative linear relationship between entropy
and relative entropy shown in Appendix 2, Figure 2.2 also confirms that a more
equal distribution of claims leads to a more stable system.
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Up to now, the impact of the distribution of claims on financial stability can be
summed up as follows:
Result 1: In a complete network, for the parameter values given above,22 a lia-
bility matrix with an equal distribution of interbank exposures (a high entropy or
a low relative entropy to the maximum entropy solution, respectively) leads to a
more stable system than a liability matrix with an unequal distribution of interbank
exposures.
2.5.2 Random graphs
A connectivity of 100% is rather unrealistic. Thus, some network has to be designed
that omits some directed links within the financial system. One option in this con-
text is to model random graphs.
Concerning completeness and interconnectedness of the network only and assuming
that banks are completely homogeneous, especially with a completely homogeneous
asset / liability structure, subsequent results should be expected according to the
theoretical findings of Allen and Gale (2000). They examine three types of networks
that are displayed in Figure 2.3. The complete and perfectly interconnected network
(Figure 1 in Allen and Gale) is equivalent to a random graph with an Erdös-Rényi
probability of 100%. In this case, the possibility that contagion occurs is rather
low because the more complete a financial system, the greater is the potential for
risk diversification. With decreasing connectivity, the network structure moves to-
wards systems that are still highly interconnected but also incomplete (equivalent to
Figure 2 in Allen and Gale). Allen and Gale show that these systems are more vul-
nerable to contagion. With connectivity decreasing further, the network structure
becomes equivalent to the disconnected system in Figure 3 in Allen and Gale. This
22 In the sections below, it is specified in more detail for which parameter values these results
hold.
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disconnection can limit the extent of contagion. Hence there is a non-monotonic
relationship between completeness of the network and financial stability.
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FIG 1: Complete market structure FIG 2: Incomplete market structure FIG 3: Disconnected incomplete
market structure
Figure 2.3: Types of networks investigated by Allen and Gale (2000)
In the following simulations, the degree of disconnection is measured by the average
number of strongly connected components across all matrices in a sample. Within
a strongly connected component, every bank can be reached by every other bank.
This does not mean that there are direct links between all banks as in a complete
network. It is sufficient that there exists a directed path between all nodes. If the
graph contains only one strongly connected component, the failure of one bank can
(potentially after several rounds of contagion) cause the failure of all other banks.
If there is more than one strongly connected component, however, it is possible that
the failure of one bank cannot cause the failure of all other banks because not all
banks can be reached by the failing bank. Hence, the higher the average number of
strongly connected components for a given Erdös-Rényi probability, the more dis-
connected is the system.
As mentioned above, the analysis of Allen and Gale is based on a banking sys-
tem with completely homogeneous banks with a completely equal asset / liability
structure. Within the simulations of this chapter, in addition to completeness and
interconnectedness, a third aspect is introduced into the analysis: the distribution
of claims within the system.
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2.5.2.1 Varying connectivity
In the following, the default algorithm is run for different values of the Erdös-Rényi
probability p, all other parameter values kept equal to those in Section 2.5.1. Each
off-diagonal element of the liability matrix that denotes an interbank claim / obliga-
tion is set equal to zero with probability 1− p.23 As for certain zero constellations,
the RAS algorithm is not able to find a valid solution; matrices that do not fit are
dropped. Furthermore, matrices where the actual share of existing links to total pos-
sible links deviates more than 0.02 from the desired connectivity are also dropped.
Thus, only matrices that fit exactly to desired row and column sums and (almost)
exactly to desired connectivity are used for the analysis.
To capture the degree of disconnection of the randomly generated network, the num-
ber of strongly connected components is computed for each graph. After generating
a large number of matrices, the average number of strongly connected components
for a given Erdös-Rényi probability is calculated. It turns out that the system starts
to become disconnected for p = 0.5 with an average number of strongly connected
components of around 1.03. For p = 0.3, more randomly generated graphs are not
perfectly interconnected any more, which yields an average number of strongly con-
nected components of about 1.80. The degree of disconnection jumps up for p = 0.1,
where the average number of strongly connected components is around 9.07.
All the following simulations are implemented by generating 50, 000 matrices for
p = 100%, 90%, 70%, 50%, 30% and 10%, respectively. Table 2.1 shows overall
correlations between entropy (= ENT ), relative entropy (= RE) and connectivity
(= p) for an Erdös-Rényi probability of 10% to 100% (with 25, 000 matrices gener-
ated in 10%-steps, respectively) using the same parameter values as in the previous
23 Alternatively, the whole graph (including the node that denotes the external sector) can be
modeled as a random graph. The aim of this chapter is, however, to investigate the impact
of the network topology of the interbank market on financial stability. Furthermore, it is
certainly more realistic to assume that all banks have connections to the external sector.
29
section.
characteristic p ENT RE
p 1 0.94 -0.94
ENT 1 -1
RE 1
Table 2.1: Correlation coefficients between characteristics in a random graph
As a first step, to capture the effect of completeness and interconnectedness on fi-
nancial stability, the average percentage of bank assets affected by failure dependent
on the connectivity of the financial system is calculated. Figure 2.4 shows the aver-
age percentage of banks’ assets affected by failure dependent on the median entropy
for a given Erdös-Rényi probability. It can be seen that a complete network (i.e.
with p = 100%) leads on average to matrices that are characterized by high en-
tropy. With decreasing connectivity, entropy also decreases, meaning that claims
are distributed more unequally (according to Table 2.1, there is a high correlation
of 0.94 between entropy and the Erdös-Rényi probability). Furthermore, Figure 2.4
shows that with decreasing completeness (i.e. a decreasing Erdös-Rényi probabil-
ity) the average percentage of assets affected by bank failure rises. This is in line
with the finding of Allen and Gale that an incomplete but perfectly interconnected
network leads to a less stable financial system than a complete network. The effect
appearing in Allen and Gale’s disconnected network can be observed for p = 10%.
For p = 10%, the average percentage of assets affected (and therefore the average
number of bank failures) is much lower than for p = 30% which can be explained by
the large rise in the average number of strongly connected components from around
1.80 to around 9.07.
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Figure 2.4: Average stability of the network dependent on connectivity and entropy
These results shown in Figure 2.4 can be obtained on average if networks are ex-
clusively characterized by their completeness and interconnectedness. However, the
effect of the structure of the financial system on financial stability can be analyzed
in more detail by additionally considering the effect of the distribution of claims for
a given connectivity. Intervals of characteristics are, as in Section 2.5.1, defined in
a way that the number of observations is the same within all intervals. Simulations
show that results are still not dependent on which bank failed first and the sample
generated.
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Figure 2.5: Stability of the network dependent on connectivity and distribution of
exposures (measured by entropy)
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In Figure 2.5 it can be seen that for p = 100% the same result is obtained as in
Figure 2.1. A liability matrix with a higher entropy leads to a lower average percent-
age of assets affected by bank failure and therefore a lower average number of bank
failures. However, with the 100% connectivity assumption, only rather high values
for entropy can be generated. Inserting zero off-diagonal “interbank” elements into
the matrix with 10% probability, which is equivalent to p = 90%, generates matrices
with a lower entropy. The negative correlation between bank failures and entropy
still holds for p = 90%. With decreasing connectivity, matrices with an even lower
entropy can be created. The negative correlation between entropy and average bank
failures, however, becomes weaker and turns into a positive correlation. This means
that for a given low Erdös-Rényi probability (for example p = 50%, p = 30% or
p = 10%), a comparatively high entropy leads on average to more banks defaulting
than a comparatively low entropy.
An interpretation for this observation is that, for a high connectivity, an equal
distribution of interbank claims is the best shock absorber due to credit risk diver-
sification, whereas an unequal distribution of claims increases the probability that
there is a second-round effect after the failure of one bank. On the contrary, when
connectivity is low, the failure of one bank is very likely to cause second-round effects
because the average amount of interbank exposures to the few connected banks is
very high. Hence, the more equal the distribution to the few other banks, the higher
the probability that all these banks fail because there are not enough counterparties
to diversify the losses induced by the shock. On the other hand, the more unequal
the distribution to the few other banks, the higher the probability that not all of
these banks fail and therefore the average number of failures is smaller in this case.
Thus, a change in the average percentage of assets in the banking sector affected
by failure (i.e. a change in the average number of bank failures) is not just due
to a change in connectivity but can also be due to a change in the distribution of
interbank claims. For example, though the overall average number of banks failing
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is higher for a connectivity of 30% compared to a connectivity of 50% (see Figure
2.4), a system with a very unequal distribution of interbank claims (low entropy)
and 30% connectivity is more stable than a system with a rather equal distribution
of interbank claims (high entropy) and 50% connectivity (see Figure 2.5). Also, a
system with a very equal distribution of interbank claims (high entropy) and 90%
connectivity is more stable than a network with 100% connectivity and a very un-
equal distribution of interbank claims (low entropy).
Thus, by additionally considering the distribution of claims within the system, it
can be seen that a complete network can be more unstable than an incomplete but
perfectly interconnected network. This finding extends the work of Allen and Gale
in a way that results could change if interbank claims are allowed to be heteroge-
neous.
Figure 2.6 and 2.7 show the average number of bank failures dependent on the rela-
tive entropy to the maximum entropy solution. As entropy and relative entropy are
exactly negatively correlated (see Appendix 2 and Table 2.1), these two figures can
be regarded as the mirror image of Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
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Figure 2.6: Average stability of the network dependent on connectivity and relative
entropy
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Figure 2.7: Stability of the network dependent on connectivity and distribution of
exposures (measured by relative entropy)
The results of this paragraph can be summarized as follows:
Result 2: Financial stability does not only depend on the completeness and in-
terconnectedness of the network but also on the distribution of claims within the
system.
Result 3: For the parameter values given above,24 the sign of the correlation be-
tween the equality of the distribution of claims (measured by entropy and relative
entropy) and financial stability changes with decreasing completeness of the net-
work. For high completeness (and high interconnectedness) an equal distribution
of claims leads to the most stable system. For lower completeness (but still high
interconnectedness) the positive correlation between entropy and number of banks
failing weakens. For very low completeness (and low interconnectedness) a more
unequal distribution of interbank claims leads to a more stable system.
As long as banks are assumed to be of equal size, the characterization of matri-
24 In the sections below, it is specified in more detail for which parameter values these results
hold.
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ces by entropy and relative entropy yields exactly the same results. Thus, all the
following investigations are only made dependent on entropy. As a next step, some
sensitivity analysis is done by varying one parameter (LGD, equity ratio or ratio of
interbank assets to total assets in the banking system), as well as connectivity, and
fixing all other parameters at their benchmark value set in Section 2.5.1.
2.5.2.2 Varying loss given default and connectivity
Figure 2.8 shows the not very surprising result that, for a given connectivity, the
average percentage of assets affected by bank failure (and thus also the average num-
ber of bank failures) increases with an increasing loss given default. An interesting
observation is that for a high LGD (= 100%) the effect of a disconnected system
(equivalent to Figure 3 in Allen and Gale) is already visible between p = 50% and
p = 30%. Starting from p = 50% the average number of bank defaults decreases
with decreasing connectivity. Hence, the impact of the disconnection of the financial
system becomes more important for high rates of LGD where the average number
of bank defaults tends to be very high.
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Figure 2.8: Average stability of the network dependent on the loss given default
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Figure 2.9 shows that a LGD of 100% leads to a positive correlation between assets
affected by bank failure and entropy, even for a high connectivity of the network.
A LGD of 30% leads to a negative correlation between assets affected by bank fail-
ure and entropy, even for a low connectivity (up to p = 30%) of the network. An
explanation for this observation is that a high LGD makes a system vulnerable to
interbank contagion as a high share of claims to the failing banks defaults. Thus,
it can be assumed that contagion occurs with certainty. In this case, it is better
to have a relatively unequal distribution of interbank exposures so that only few
banks are hit by a second-round effect of contagion. For a low LGD, the system is
rather resilient to interbank contagion. In this case, second-round effects only occur
if interbank exposures are distributed very unequally, i.e. interbank claims are not
well diversified among counterparties. This result is exactly in line with the findings
of Mistrulli (2011), who shows that for low and medium LGDs, the maximum en-
tropy assumption tends to underestimate the severity of contagion. For high LGDs,
however, using the maximum entropy assumption leads to an overestimation of the
severity of contagion.
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Figure 2.9: Stability of the network dependent on the loss given default and the
distribution of interbank exposures
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2.5.2.3 Varying equity ratio and connectivity
Figure 2.10 shows, not surprisingly, that a lower equity ratio leads, for a given
Erdös-Rényi probability, to a higher average number of bank assets affected by fail-
ure. Again, the impact of the disconnection of the financial system becomes more
important for parameter constellations where the average number of bank defaults
tends to be very high, i.e. for low equity ratios.
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Figure 2.10: Average stability of the network dependent on the equity ratio
Looking at the effect of the distribution of claims for given connectivity in Figure
2.11, it can be seen that for an equity ratio of 9% the correlation of entropy and
percentage of assets affected by bank failure is negative for all values of p (except
p = 10%). For an equity ratio of 3% the correlation is always positive. Similar to
the variation of LGD, systems with high equity ratios are more stable with an equal
distribution of claims because second-round effects only occur when interbank claims
are not well diversified. Systems with low equity ratios are, for a given Erdös-Rényi
probability, more stable with an unequal distribution of claims so that second-round
effects (that occur almost with certainty) only hit few counterparties in the financial
system.
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Figure 2.11: Stability of the network dependent on the equity ratio and the distri-
bution of interbank exposures
2.5.2.4 Varying ratio of interbank assets to total assets and connectivity
Additionally, the ratio of interbank assets to total assets φ can be varied. Figure
2.12 shows that a higher ratio of interbank assets to total assets leads, for a given
Erdös-Rényi probability, to a higher average percentage of assets affected by bank
failure. This is not surprising because, for a given equity ratio and LGD, banks be-
come more vulnerable to the default of a neighboring bank. The reason is that, on
average, the bilateral exposure per counterparty increases with an increasing ratio
of interbank assets to total assets. Furthermore, for high numbers of bank failures
(i.e. high numbers of φ) the effect of a disconnected system is again already visible
for an Erdös-Rényi probability below 50%.
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Figure 2.12: Average stability of the network dependent on the share of interbank
assets
Figure 2.13 shows that the correlation between entropy and average percentage of
assets affected by failure changes from positive to negative at an Erdös-Rényi proba-
bility of around 70%, independent of the value of φ. Thus, contrary to the variation
of LGD and r, there is no influence of φ on the correlation between entropy and
average number of banks defaults.25 However, one has to be careful when compar-
ing samples of matrices with different φ. Looking at the range of entropy values
created for a given Erdös-Rényi probability in Figure 2.13 it can be seen that, for
higher values of φ, the random generator on average creates matrices with a higher
entropy. Thus, not the same entropy intervals can be compared when investigating
the average percentage of bank assets affected by failure for different values of φ.
25 In additional simulations the LGD and the equity ratio were varied for different values of
φ. The result is that high values of LGD or low values of r lead to a positive correlation
between entropy and the average percentage of assets affected, and low values of LGD or high
values of r lead to a negative correlation, independent of φ. Thus, a variation of LGD and r
changes the correlation between entropy and average percentage of assets affected by failure;
a variation of φ, however, does not.
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Figure 2.13: Stability of the network dependent on the share of interbank assets and
the distribution of interbank exposures
Paragraphs 2.5.2.2 to 2.5.2.4 can be summarized by the following result:
Result 4: For a given total amount of interbank assets, the sign of the correla-
tion between the equality of the distribution of claims (entropy) and the average
percentage of bank assets affected by failure (or average number of banks default-
ing, respectively) tends to be positive for parameters that make a system vulnerable
to interbank contagion (i.e. a high LGD and low equity ratios). On the other hand,
the sign of the correlation tends to be negative for parameters that make the system
resilient to interbank contagion (i.e. a low LGD and high equity ratios). For inter-
mediate parameter values, the sign of the correlation between the equality of the
distribution of claims and average number of banks defaulting changes from nega-
tive to positive with decreasing connectivity (see results in Section 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.1).
In further simulations, additional parameters are varied. At first, the total num-
ber of assets was changed. This, however, does not alter the results as relative
numbers (for example the equity ratio or the ratio of interbank assets to total as-
sets) do not change. Increasing the number of banks in the system makes it (all
other variables kept equal) less vulnerable to the failure of one bank as the average
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amount of bilateral exposures per counterparty decreases with an increasing number
of counterparties. Furthermore, these simulations were run for “extreme” parameter
values, i.e. parameters that all make a financial system very unstable (a high LGD,
a low equity ratio and a high share of interbank assets to total assets) or stable,
respectively. The results confirmed the main findings summarized in Result 4.
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2.5.3 Money center systems
The analysis of the impact of the distribution of claims on financial stability in ran-
dom graphs leads to some interesting results. It is, however, questionable, whether
a random graph is a good description of real world financial networks. In the liter-
ature, it is sometimes stated that a more adequate model of a financial system is a
scale-free network (see, for example, Boss et al. (2004) and Soramäki et al. (2007)).
Craig and von Peter (2010) prefer to model financial systems as (multiple) money
center systems, where few large core banks are strongly interconnected (i.e. they
form a complete network) and a larger number of small banks in the periphery are
only connected to core banks but not to other banks in the periphery. Figure 2.14
shows an example of a money center model (without the external sector).
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Figure 2.14: Example of a money center system with 15 banks (3 core banks and
12 banks in the periphery)
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The financial network in Figure 2.14, including the external sector, can be described
by an adjacency matrix:
L =

A1,core A2,core A3,core A4,per A5,per . . . A15,per AN
L1,core 0 1 1 | 1 1 . . . 0 1
L2,core 1 0 1 | 0 0 . . . 0 1
L3,core 1 1 0 | 0 0 . . . 1 1
− − − − − − − −
L4,per 1 0 0 | 0 0 . . . 0 1
L5,per 1 0 0 | 0 0 . . . 0 1
... ... ... ... | ... ... ... ... ...
L15,per 0 0 1 | 0 0 . . . 0 1
LN 1 1 1 1 1 . . . 1 0

The interbank part of this adjacency matrix, i.e. the (N − 1) × (N − 1) matrix
that is obtained when deleting the last row and the last column of L, can be written
in block matrix form:26
LIB =

Λ1 | Λ2
− − −
Λ3 | Λ4

By assumption, the money center model applied in this chapter has to follow cer-
26 The way this money center system is constructed is very similar to the “block-model approach”
of Craig and von Peter (2010). The conditions a money center system has to fulfill in this
chapter are, however, slightly different.
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tain patterns. First, all core banks are strongly connected to each other. Thus, all
off-diagonal elements of the top left corner of the adjacency matrix LIB (Λ1) have
to be equal to one. Second, each bank in the periphery is linked to exactly one
money center bank in both directions. Thus, the top right corner (Λ2) has exactly
one non-zero element per column and the bottom left corner of the adjacency matrix
(Λ3) is the exactly transposed version of the top right corner. Third, banks in the
periphery are not linked to each other. Hence, the bottom right corner (Λ4) con-
tains only zeros. Thus, by construction, the strongly connected component always
includes all financial institutions in the system.
After constructing the adjacency matrix, the edges of the graph obtain weights that
are, similar to the case of the random graph, created by a random generator. For
given row and column sums, elements are again adjusted by using the RAS algo-
rithm.
2.5.3.1 Varying the number of core banks and the concentration ratio
At first, the stability of a money center model is investigated by varying two main
parameters that characterize its pattern: the number of core banks ncore and the
concentration ratio CR. To create a more reasonable ratio of core banks to periphery
banks, the number of banks in the financial system is increased to 15, i.e. N = 16.
Remaining parameters are set at their benchmark values, i.e. LGD = 0.5, r = 0.06
and φ = 0.3. Total assets in the banking system are again set at Abanks = 1, 000 and
each simulation is run for a sample of 50, 000 randomly generated matrices. While
for the random graph it does not matter which bank fails first, for the money center
model it is assumed that a core bank fails.27
Figures 2.15 to 2.18 show the average percentage of total assets that are affected
by bank failure for ncore = 5 to ncore = 2. For each number of core banks the con-
27 Additionally, simulations with a periphery bank failing were run. Not surprisingly, in this
case, the financial system is more stable than in the case of a core bank failing.
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centration ratio is varied from CR = 0.99 (core banks hold almost all assets in the
banking system) to CR = 0.4 (core banks hold 40% of total assets in the banking
system). The lower bound of the concentration ratio is set in such a way that, for all
values of ncore investigated, it cannot happen that core banks have smaller balance
sheet totals than periphery banks.
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Figure 2.15: Stability of the network with five core banks
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Figure 2.16: Stability of the network with four core banks
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Figure 2.17: Stability of the network with three core banks
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Figure 2.18: Stability of the network with two core banks
Not surprisingly, entropy decreases with an increasing concentration ratio as a higher
concentration of assets among few core banks implies a more unequal distribution of
claims within the financial system. Furthermore, for a given number of core banks,
the average percentage of assets affected by bank failure increases with the concen-
tration ratio. One reason is that the total amount of assets of the bank that fails
first, and therefore the initial percentage of assets affected by bank failure, is higher.
But this is not the only effect. With increasing size of core banks compared to banks
in the periphery (i.e. a higher CR), and all other variables kept equal, the average
weights of the links between core banks increase. Thus, the amount of interbank
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assets between core banks becomes larger on average, which makes core banks more
vulnerable to interbank contagion. And the more core banks fail, the more banks
in the periphery are on average affected by domino effects.
Comparing the stability of the financial system by varying the number of core banks
ncore it can be seen that, all other parameters kept equal, the stability of the finan-
cial system increases with an increasing number of core banks. This effect is again
due to the size of the core banks. For a given concentration ratio, the size of the
core banks decreases with an increasing number of core banks. Thus, the average
amount of interbank assets between core banks also becomes smaller and the prob-
ability that domino effects between core banks occur, is reduced.
Hence, the main result of this paragraph is:
Result 5: Increasing asset concentration (a higher concentration ratio for a given
number of core banks or a lower number of core banks for a given concentration
ratio) within a money center system makes it more unstable on average.
2.5.3.2 Comparison to random graphs
Additionally, the stability of a money center system is compared to the stability
of a random graph. As a benchmark, the investigation of the stability of random
graphs with the same system size (in terms of total assets) and the same number of
banks as in the money center system is included in each subsequent figure. When
modeling the random graph, it is assumed that all banks have homogeneous balance
sheet totals and are linked randomly with a certain probability. The money center
system is interlinked according to the description in Section 2.5.3.
However, one has to be careful when setting the parameter values for the money
center system. Within a random graph, the average amount of bilateral interbank
47
exposures (over the whole sample of generated matrices) is the same between all
banks. In a money center model, though, if the concentration ratio is chosen too
low (or the number of core banks is chosen too high), i.e. core banks do not have a
balance sheet total that is large enough compared to periphery banks, the assumed
network topology of the money center model leads to interbank connections where
core banks have less exposures to each other than to banks in the periphery. The
reason is that periphery banks have all their interbank exposures to one core bank
by assumption. To obtain a valid liability matrix for given balance sheet totals, the
result is a very low weight on interbank exposures among core banks. This does not
fit to realistic banking systems. Thus, in the following simulations, it is assumed
that the average amount of bilateral interbank assets each core bank holds against
another core bank is at least as high as the average amount of bilateral interbank
assets a core bank holds against a periphery bank. This amounts to a minimum
concentration ratio of CR = 0.25 for ncore = 2, CR = 0.35 for ncore = 3, CR = 0.4
for ncore = 4 and CR = 0.45 for ncore = 5.28
Figures 2.19 to 2.22 show that (for the same values of N , Abanks, φ, LGD and r
as in Section 2.5.3.1) the random graph is always more stable on average than the
money center system with the minimum concentration ratio derived above.29
28 These results are obtained by calculating the average amount of bilateral interbank assets
between two core banks and between a core and a periphery bank by simulation for different
values of CR (in steps of 0.05). The value of CR, where the discrepancy between the average
amount of interbank assets each core bank holds against another core bank and the average
amount of interbank assets a core bank holds against a periphery bank is minimal, is then
chosen as the minimum concentration ratio for further simulations.
29 In additional simulations the same result was obtained for extreme values of LGD and r.
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Figure 2.19: Stability of money center system (five core banks) and random graph
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Figure 2.20: Stability of money center system (four core banks) and random graph
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Figure 2.21: Stability of money center system (three core banks) and random graph
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Figure 2.22: Stability of money center system (two core banks) and random graph
Several reasons for this result can be mentioned. First, in the money center model,
the initial percentage of assets affected by bank failure is larger than in the random
graph. The reason is that, for the given minimum concentration ratio, core banks in
the money center model are always larger than banks in a random graph. Second, a
large balance sheet total of the failing core bank implies on average a high amount
of interbank claims defaulting in the first round. Thus, the initial shock is larger
compared to a random graph. Third, among core banks there are only limited possi-
bilities of risk diversification, as they are only linked to the other core banks and to
few periphery banks. Additionally, there is no sufficient risk diversification possible
for periphery banks that hold all their claims against one core bank. Fourth, money
center models are always strongly connected by assumption, i.e. they have only one
strongly connected component. Hence, domino effects can never be curtailed by
disconnection of the financial system.
Thus, to summarize the main findings of this paragraph:
Result 6: On the assumption that the average amount of bilateral interbank assets
between two core banks is at least as high as between a core and a periphery bank, a
money center system with asset concentration among core banks is (in all previous
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simulations) less stable on average than a system of banks with homogeneous size
that follows a random graph.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the impact of the structure of the matrix of interbank liabilities on
financial stability is analyzed. After characterizing the financial system according
to the number of banks, total assets in the banking system, equity ratio, the ratio
of interbank to total assets and loss given default, a large number of valid interbank
liability matrices is created by a random generator for given row and column sums.
Thus, a new approach of this chapter is that interbank contagion is investigated
for a large sample of interbank matrices. These matrices are then characterized by
entropy and relative entropy to the maximum entropy solution, which constitute
measures of the equality of the distribution of interbank exposures. As a next step,
domino effects resulting from the default of one bank are modeled. As long as banks
are assumed to be of equal size (to be able to only focus on the effects of the structure
of the liability matrix), it does not matter which bank fails first. Additionally, as a
large number of valid matrices is generated, results do not depend on the sample of
matrices.
The first simulations are run for complete networks and “intermediate” parameter
values. The main result is that a more equal distribution of interbank claims leads
to a more stable financial system. These results, however, change if an incomplete
network is considered. Starting with a random graph and, again, “intermediate”
parameter values, it can be seen that the sign of the correlation between equality of
distribution of claims and percentage of assets affected by bank failure changes with
decreasing connectivity. Furthermore, a crucial result of these simulations is that
not only completeness and interconnectedness of a financial network, as investigated
theoretically in Allen and Gale (2000), matters, but also the distribution of claims
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within the financial network. In this chapter, cases can be shown where, contrary to
the findings of Allen and Gale, a complete network (with an unequal distribution of
claims) is less stable than an incomplete but perfectly interconnected network (with
an equal distribution of claims).
As a next step, further sensitivity analysis is implemented by varying loss given
default, banks’ equity ratio and the ratio of interbank assets to total assets. The
main result in this context is that the sign of the correlation between entropy and
the average percentage of assets affected by bank failure depends on connectivity,
loss given default and equity ratio. For high values of LGD and low values of r
(i.e. parameters that make a financial system vulnerable to interbank contagion)
the sign of the correlation between entropy and the average percentage of assets
affected tends to be positive, while for low values of LGD and high values of r (i.e.
parameters that make a financial system resilient to interbank contagion) the sign of
the correlation tends to be negative. For “intermediate” parameter values the sign
of the correlation changes from negative to positive with decreasing connectivity.
A second, probably more realistic, approach to modeling incomplete networks is to
consider money center systems. The main idea of money center models is to distin-
guish between large core banks that are strongly connected to each other and small
banks in the periphery that are only linked to one core bank. Not surprisingly, the
more concentrated assets are within a money center system, the less stable it is if
a core bank fails. Additionally, using reasonable parameters for the number of core
banks and the concentration of assets among core banks, it turns out that, for all
simulations run, the money center system is less stable than a random graph with
homogeneous bank size.
As a conclusion, this chapter extends the existing literature on interbank contagion
within a financial network by explicitly considering the distribution of claims within
the financial system, and therefore gives a variety of insights into the determinants
of financial stability. This approach can be widened to aspects of interbank con-
52
tagion extending domino effects (for example contagion due to liquidity problems).
Therefore, this approach leaves a lot of new topics for future research.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Appendix 1: Generation of the maximum entropy so-
lution of an interbank liability matrix
The starting point is a matrix X with given row sums Li, i ∈ {1, ..., N} and column
sums Aj, j ∈ {1, ..., N}.30
X =

A1 A2 · · · AN
L1 · · · · · · · · · · · ·
L2 · · · · · · · · · · · ·
... ... ... ... ...
LN · · · · · · · · · · · ·

with ∑Ni=1 Li = L, ∑Nj=1 Aj = A and A = L.
As entropy methods must be applied on probability fields, some normalization of
row and column sums is necessary:
Xp =

ap1 a
p
2 · · · a
p
N
lp1 · · · · · · · · · · · ·
lp2 · · · · · · · · · · · ·
... ... ... ... ...
lpN · · · · · · · · · · · ·

with lpi = LiL and a
p
j =
Aj
A
.
30 See Upper and Worms (2004)
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Furthermore ∑Ni=1 lpi = ∑Nj=1 apj = 1.
The ap’s and lp’s are interpreted as realizations of the marginal distributions f(a)
and f(l), the elements of the liability matrix Xp
(
= xpij
)
as realizations of their joint
distribution f(a, l). If f(a) and f(l) are independent, the elements xpij of the nor-
malized matrix are given by xpij := l
p
i a
p
j . This results in maximizing the entropy of
Xp.
Xp =

ap1 a
p
2 · · · a
p
N
lp1 x
p
11 x
p
12 · · · x
p
1N
lp2 x
p
21 x
p
22 · · · x
p
2N
... ... ... ... ...
lpN x
p
N1 x
p
N2 · · · x
p
NN

with ∑Nj=1 xpij = lpi and ∑Ni=1 xpij = apj .
The problem is that the matrix Xp has non-zero elements on the main diagonal
which means that banks lend to themselves. To avoid this phenomenon, a new ma-
trix Xp0 with zero elements on the diagonal has to be created, i.e. xpij is set equal to
zero for i = j.
Xp0 =

ap1 a
p
2 · · · a
p
N
lp1 0 xp12 · · · xp1N
lp2 x
p
21 0 · · · xp2N
... ... ... ... ...
lpN x
p
N1 x
p
N2 · · · 0

The new matrix should deviate from the maximum entropy solution as little as
possible. Thus, out of all possible normalized matrices Xp, a matrix X∗ has to be
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created that minimizes the relative entropy with respect to the matrix Xp0 .
x∗ = argmin xp′ · lnx
p
xp0
(2.8)
s.t. x∗ ≥ 0 and Ax∗ =
[
ap
′
, lp
]′
,
where x∗ and xp0 are (N2 − N) × 1 vectors containing the off-diagonal elements of
X∗ and Xp0 , ap and lp are the row and column sums of Xp (
[
ap
′
, lp
]′
has the size
2N × 1), and A is a 2N × (N2 −N) matrix containing zeros and ones so that the
restrictions concerning row and column sums are fulfilled.
This minimization problem can be either solved using the RAS algorithm (see Blien
and Graef (1991)) or using the “fmincon-command” of MATLAB’s optimization
toolbox. Both approaches lead to the same results.31
After solving the minimization problem, a matrix X∗ is obtained that deviates from
the assumption of independence as little as possible.
X∗ =

ap1 a
p
2 · · · a
p
N
lp1 0 x∗12 · · · x∗1N
lp2 x
∗
21 0 · · · x∗2N
... ... ... ... ...
lpN x
∗
N1 x
∗
N2 · · · 0

As a last step, X∗ can be transformed back into a “real” liability matrix X by
multiplying each element x∗ij as well as the row and column sums l
p
i and a
p
j with L
or A.
31 However, using the “fmincon-command” can become computationally intensive if the liability
matrices are large.
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2.7.2 Appendix 2: Specification of the linear relationship
between entropy and relative entropy to the maximum
entropy solution
Consider a network of N nodes (N − 1 banks and one external sector) and, in
particular, the (N−1)×(N−1) interbank liability matrix that is normalized by the
total amount of interbank assets / liabilities. Normalization implies that the sum of
row as well as the sum of column sums has to be equal to 1. The characteristic of the
maximum entropy solution of the interbank matrix is that claims are distributed as
equally as possible for given row and column sums. Thus, on the assumption that
all banks are of equal size, the general result of the maximum entropy solution is a
matrix with row and column sums of 1
N−1 and off-diagonal elements of
1
(N−1)(N−2) ,
respectively:
X∗ =

1
N−1
1
N−1 · · ·
1
N−1
1
N−1 0
1
(N−1)(N−2) · · ·
1
(N−1)(N−2)
1
N−1
1
(N−1)(N−2) 0 · · ·
1
(N−1)(N−2)
... ... ... ... ...
1
N−1
1
(N−1)(N−2)
1
(N−1)(N−2) · · · 0

The relative entropy is given by:
RE = ∑N−1i=1 ∑N−1j=1 lpijln( lpijxpij
)
with 0 · ln(0) := 0 and 0 · ln(00) := 0.
This equation can be rearranged:
RE = ∑N−1i=1 ∑N−1j=1 lpijln (lpij)−∑N−1i=1 ∑N−1j=1 lpijln (xpij)
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Assuming that xpij constitutes an element of the matrix of the maximum entropy
solution, yields the following equation:
RE = ∑N−1i=1 ∑N−1j=1 lpijln (lpij)−∑N−1i=1 ∑N−1j=1 lpijln ( 1(N−1)(N−2))
= ∑N−1i=1 ∑N−1j=1 lpijln (lpij)− ln ( 1(N−1)(N−2)) (∑N−1i=1 ∑N−1j=1 lpij)
= ∑N−1i=1 ∑N−1j=1 lpijln (lpij)− ln ( 1(N−1)(N−2)) · 1
Entropy is given by:
ENT = −∑N−1i=1 ∑N−1j=1 lpij · ln (lpij)
with 0 · ln(0) := 0.
Inserting the equation for entropy yields the following result:
RE = −ENT − ln
(
1
(N−1)(N−2)
)
or
RE = ln ((N − 1)(N − 2))− ENT
As an example, consider 11 nodes in the system (10 banks and one external sector).
The relationship between entropy and relative entropy to the maximum entropy so-
lution is thus given by:
RE = 4.4998− ENT
This equation can be confirmed by simulation (see Figure 2.23).
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Figure 2.23: Negative linear relationship between entropy and relative entropy to
the maximum entropy solution for N = 11
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Chapter 3
Contagion in the interbank market
with stochastic loss given default∗
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Christoph Memmel and Ingrid Stein. Opinions
expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche
Bundesbank.
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3.1 Introduction
The collapse of Lehman Brothers turned the 2007/2008 turmoil into a deep global
financial crisis. But even before the Lehman default interbank markets ceased to
function properly. In particular, the fear of contagion via interbank markets played
a crucial role. While banks could gauge their direct losses from exposure to so-called
toxic assets, they could not assess their counterparties’ losses and creditworthiness
and were therefore not willing to lend money to other banks, causing the break-
down of interbank markets. This led to an unprecedented liquidity extension of
central banks and government rescue packages (see Stolz and Wedow (2010)) which,
however, could not avoid deep recessions in many countries of the world. From an
economic perspective, it is therefore essential to have a tool allowing to assess po-
tential contagion risks via interbank markets.
Creating such a tool is the aim of this chapter. We study contagion in the German
interbank market, one of the largest interbank markets in Europe. We carry out
a simulation exercise where we assume that a certain bank fails and examine how
this failure affects other banks’ solvency via direct effects and chain reactions in
the banking system. Throughout this (and also the next) chapter, our focus is on
14 large and internationally active German banks and the sectors of savings and
cooperative banks.
In our contagion analysis, we only investigate the direct, mechanic contagion effects
in the interbank market, which means that we analyze the direct (on and off-balance
sheet) exposure between the banks. What we do not consider are effects like a gen-
eral loss in confidence among banks which could lead to a drying up of the interbank
market and thereby to a liquidity shortage, contagion due to market perception, i.e.
that all banks with a similar business model are subject to distrust when such a
bank runs into distress, or herding behavior, where massive sales can drive the price
of an asset below its fundamental value and banks using fair-value accounting have
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to adjust asset values. Hence, our analysis covers only part of the possible contagion
effects. However, this analysis is relatively precise because it is based on hard data
and not so much on estimated economic relationships.
We investigate in particular the role of the loss given default (LGD) in the contagion
process which is a key factor for the extent of contagion in analyses like this. The
LGD, multiplied by the total exposure of a creditor bank to a debtor bank, gives the
actual loss of the creditor bank in the event that the debtor bank fails. The LGD
can vary between 0% (e.g. in the event that the defaulted loan is fully collateralized)
and 100% (which is equivalent to a zero recovery rate of the defaulted loan). As
there is usually only sparse information about recovery rates in the case of bank de-
faults, the standard approach in the literature on interbank contagion is to assume
a fixed value of the LGD and repeat the simulation exercise with different values
of this LGD. The literature generally finds that losses in the total banking system
crucially depend on the LGD value. Below a certain threshold of LGD potential
losses are minor. However, as soon as the LGD exceeds a certain threshold, there
are considerable risks of large parts of the banking system being affected and heavy
losses in the banking system occurring (see e.g. Upper and Worms (2004) and van
Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006)). Therefore, the standard approach has the consider-
able drawback that an assessment of contagion risks in the real world is difficult
and associated with great uncertainties. We, however, overcome this shortcoming
by using a unique dataset of realized LGDs of defaulted interbank exposures.
Our contributions to the literature are as follows. First, by using this dataset of
realized LGDs on the interbank market, we are able to investigate the empirical
patterns of actual LGDs of bank loans. Second, unlike the vast majority of papers
in the literature, we dispose of detailed data about the pairwise interbank exposures
and do not need to estimate them. Instead, we are able to precisely quantify in-
terbank exposures (including off-balance sheet and derivative positions) within the
national market. Third, in contrast to most papers in the literature, we conduct the
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simulation exercise with a stochastic LGD derived from the observed distribution
of LGDs (instead of a stepwise increase of constant values). We thereby obtain a
distribution of the number of contagious bank defaults which allows a more realistic
assessment of contagion risks.
Our main findings are, first of all, that LGDs follow a markedly u-shaped distribu-
tion, which can be reasonably well approximated by a beta distribution. Second of
all, using the precise information about interbank exposures and the distribution of
LGD, we find that contagion in the German interbank market may happen. Third,
for the point in time under consideration, we find that the number of bank defaults
increases on average when we assume a stochastic LGD instead of a constant one.
This chapter is structured in the following way: In Section 3.2, we give a brief
overview of the literature on interbank contagion as well as LGD modeling and
state our contribution to the literature. Section 3.3 deals with the description of the
contagion exercise and the structure of the interbank network. Section 3.4 summa-
rizes how we model the LGD. In Section 3.5, we show the results of the contagion
exercise and in Section 3.6 the conclusion is presented.
3.2 Literature
This chapter relates to three strands of the literature. The first strand is about em-
pirical simulation studies of interbank contagion (see Upper (2011) for an overview).
Especially national European interbank markets have been the focus of empirical
studies (see, for instance, van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) for the Netherlands, Shel-
don and Maurer (1998) for Switzerland or Mistrulli (2011) for Italy). In addition
to studies based on national interbank markets, there are cross-border contagion
simulations. These studies are either based on BIS data on consolidated banking
statistics (see Espinosa-Vega and Solé (2010) and Degryse et al. (2010)) or analyze
international sector interlinkages (see Castrén and Kavonius (2009)). Most papers
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in this strand do not have direct access to information on interbank exposures but
apply either statistical methods to derive the bilateral exposures or rely on data
which cover only part of the interbank exposures. We have a certain advantage
compared to these studies since we are able to precisely quantify the amount of bi-
lateral exposures for a system of 14 large and internationally active German banks
as well as the sectors of the savings and the cooperative banks. Our dataset is
based on the German credit register and includes off-balance sheet and derivative
positions. It contains all bilateral exposures of the 14 banks and two sectors above a
threshold of EUR 1.5m. This threshold is not relevant for the purpose of our study
since interbank exposures are typically large.
The second strand of literature we contribute to deals with extensions of the usual
contagion exercises. Cifuentes et al. (2005) introduce additional stress due to declin-
ing asset prices as a result of fire sales; Elsinger et al. (2006) integrate the interbank
contagion model in a stress testing setting that includes macroeconomic shocks.
Espinosa-Vega and Solé (2010) and Chan-Lau (2010) do not only consider credit
risk, but funding risk as well. They argue that the banks’ funding is hindered when
the interbank market does not function properly. Aikman et al. (2009) incorporate
various of these aspects into one quantitative model of systemic stability. Degryse
and Nguyen (2007) explicitly model the LGDs, deriving them endogenously from
the banks’ balance sheet composition. Our extension, too, is about LGD modeling.
However, we model the LGDs as stochastic.
The third strand of literature deals with the distribution of LGDs. Huang et al.
(2009) and Tarashev and Zhu (2008) choose a stochastic setting for the LGD. They
assume a triangular distribution with the probability mass concentrated in the cen-
ter of the distribution (more precisely at 55% and 50%, respectively). Crouhy et al.
(2000) model a stochastic LGD with the help of a beta distribution. They estimate
the parameters by using bond market data. Their estimations yield the result that
the LGD follows a unimodal beta distribution. Our contribution consists in estimat-
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ing the distribution of the LGDs of interbank exposures. We have a unique dataset
of realized interbank LGDs at our disposal. This data suggests a markedly u-shaped
density for the LGD, i.e. a distribution with a vast probability mass at zero and 100
per cent. This finding is in line with Dermine and de Carvalho (2006) and Bastos
(2010) who use a dataset of defaulted loans provided by a large Portuguese bank
and find a u-shaped LGD distribution for non-financial firms.
3.3 Round-by-round algorithm
In the event that a bank fails, the banks that have granted loans to this bank suffer
losses from their exposures. The contagion process in the interbank market may stop
after the first round, but may also propagate further through the system. Banks,
which fell into distress as a consequence of the initial distress, may now themselves
become a source of contagion. This process will continue round-by-round until no
new banks are affected (possibly leading to a large number of failures in total) or
until the supervisory authorities manage to put an end to this process.
In this section we describe a simulation exercise so as to study the extent to which
the German banking system may be prone to such a contagious process. We apply
the round-by-round algorithm as described in Upper (2011).
1. Initially, bank i fails exogenously.
2. As a result, banks whose exposure to bank i multiplied by the loss given
default (LGD) exceeds their buffer of tier-1 capital, also fail. We define a
bank to be in default in the event that its tier-1 capital ratio is below 6 per
cent of its risk weighted assets. This default definition is in line with the new
Basel accord where the minimum capital requirement is also set at 6%.32 We
do not take into account potential reactions of the lender banks. For example,
32 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), paragraph 50.
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the lender banks may have hidden reserves which they release to raise their
tier-1 capital. Instead, we assume that write-offs on interbank loans decrease
the lender’s tier-1 capital by the same amount.
3. Further banks may fail if their combined exposure to the banks that have failed
so far (times the LGD) is greater than their capital buffer.
4. The contagious process stops when there is a round with no new failures.
Thus, bank j is in distress, if
Ej −
∑
k (LGDjk · xjk · 1k∈D)
RWAj − 0.2 ·
∑
k (xjk · 1k∈D)
< 0.06 (3.1)
In this context, Ej is the tier-1 capital of bank j, xjk is the exposure of bank j to
bank k, 1k∈D is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 in the event that bank
k is in distress (and 0 otherwise), LGDjk is the loss given default associated with
the exposure of bank j to bank k and RWAj are the risk weighted assets of bank
j. We assume that interbank claims receive a weight of 0.2 in banks’ risk weighted
assets.33 When calculating the tier-1 capital ratio, we also take into account that
every claim to a bank that failed completely disappears from the creditor bank’s
risk weighted assets.
One can argue that a bank can serve its debt unless the capital of this bank is
totally consumed and becomes negative. However, we use the stricter criterion of a
minimum level of 6% tier-1 capital. We do this for the following reasons: (i) When
a bank is shut down and liquidated (because, for instance, it no longer meets the
minimum regulatory capital requirements), it is questionable whether one receives
the bank assets’ book value, especially the book value of its illiquid positions may be
far higher than the proceeds from a hasty fire sale. (ii) A bank with a sharp drop in
its capital ratio will no longer have any access to short term funding at sustainable
33 The risk weight of 0.2 stems from the Basel I and Basel II framework applied to German
banks, see e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank (2004), p.77.
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rates. Soon afterwards, the unfavorable funding conditions will have consumed what
is left of the capital.
We carry out this simulation exercise for each of 14 large and internationally active
banks in Germany (the biggest private commercial banks and the central institutes
of the savings and cooperative banks) and the two sectors of the savings and coop-
erative banks, which we treat as aggregate sectors. Thus, we consider 16 units in
total which potentially have bilateral exposures to each other. We treat the savings
and cooperative banks in an aggregate way because single banks that belong to this
group are usually very small.34 Hence, it is almost sure that the default of one of
these small banks would not trigger contagious reactions. If, however, the whole
sector of savings or cooperative banks were to be hit by an aggregate shock (which
is not completely unlikely because of similar business models), a contagious effect
on the rest of the banking system is quite possible. To sum up, we cover about 67%
of the total assets of the German banking system in our analysis.
To run the round-by-round algorithm, information is needed on (i) the pairwise
exposures between the banks and (ii) the appropriate loss, given a bank fails. Con-
cerning the pairwise exposures, we have detailed information on exposures within
the German interbank market. This leaves the question of determining the loss given
default. From the literature we know that this is crucial for the contagion exercises
(see e.g. Upper and Worms (2004)). Different solutions are possible.
1. Constant LGD. The loss given default is exogenously set to a constant value,
say 40% or 45%.35 To account for the fact that the LGD crucially drives the
34 Craig and von Peter (2010) show that only a small number of banks form the so-called core of
the German interbank market and that these core banks act as an intermediary for numerous
small banks (like savings and cooperative banks).
35 Kaufman (1994) gives an overview of loss given default estimates for bank failures; the esti-
mates vary considerably. James (1991) finds that the average loss of failed US banks during
the period of 1985 to 1988 was about 30%. In addition, there were direct costs associated
with the bank closures of 10% of the assets. In our dataset, the mean LGD is about 45%.
67
results, one can vary the constant loss given default over a wide range of values.
The contagion exercise is then run for each different value of the LGD.
2. Endogenous LGD. If information on the actual over-indebtedness of the dis-
tressed bank, the bankruptcy cost and the degree of collateralization were
available, it would be possible to endogenously calculate the loss given de-
fault.
3. Stochastic LGD. Our supervisory data concerning the write-offs of interbank
loans show that the loss given default varies considerably, with a large portion
of the probability mass at 0% and at 100%. A possible explanation for this
quasi-dichotomy may be that the loans are either fully collateralized (as in the
Repo-market) or completely unsecured. This finding is not in line with the
assumption of a constant LGD (solution 1). Solution 1 would rather be in line
with a distribution of the LGDs concentrated in one point.
In this study, we use the third solution. In contrast to the existing literature that
exogenously assumes some constant LGD value, we have a unique dataset of ac-
tually realized LGDs on the interbank market. This dataset provides an empirical
frequency distribution of LGDs. The exact properties of the LGD distribution are
investigated in Section 3.4.
As outlined above, the first step for running the round-by-round algorithm consists
of establishing the matrix of mutual interbank exposures. We use Bundesbank data
from the German credit register (MiMiK) to obtain the necessary information.36
Unlike credit registers in most other countries, the German credit register also in-
cludes interbank loans and is not confined to non-financials. This data base offers
us a certain data advantage compared to other studies since we are able to deter-
mine the complete matrix of interbank exposures. By contrast, balance sheet data
only show (for each bank) the aggregate amount lent to or borrowed from all banks.
36 See Schmieder (2006) for more details about this database.
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Moreover, payment data or large exposure data are generally less comprehensive
than credit register data and include, for example in the case of payment data, in-
formation about short-term lending only.
The German credit register contains quarterly data on large exposures of banks to
individual borrowers or single borrower units (e.g. groups). Banking institutions
located in Germany are required to report if their exposures to an individual bor-
rower or the sum of exposures to borrowers belonging to one borrower unit exceeds
the threshold of EUR 1.5m at least once in the respective quarter. We think that
the threshold of EUR 1.5m does not cause a serious bias since the typical interbank
loan is relatively large and exceeds the threshold of EUR 1.5m.
The credit register applies a broad definition of a loan. Loans in this sense include
traditional loans, bonds, off-balance sheet positions and exposures from derivative
positions. However, trading book positions are excluded. We start by analyzing
gross on- and off-balance sheet exposures as a benchmark case. In Section 3.5.2,
we run simulations considering on-balance sheet exposures only. Furthermore, we
investigate the case of netting. It is, however, by far not clear whether netting can
be enforced in case of a bank failure.37
For the simulation exercise, we use data from the fourth quarter of 2010. The result-
ing matrix of interbank exposures gives some interesting insight into the German
interbank market. As we consider 14 large and internationally active German banks
as well as the savings and cooperative sector, we obtain a 16 × 16 matrix of inter-
bank exposures. Not surprisingly, we almost have a complete network, i.e. most
of the off-diagonal elements of this matrix are non-zero. To be precise, only two
off-diagonal elements are zero, i.e. only two of the 240 possible interbank relations
do not exist.
Table 3.1 in Appendix 1 shows some summary statistics of the interbank network we
consider in this chapter. To capture the inequality of how banks spread their inter-
37 See Mistrulli (2011) for this and other arguments concerning the simulation method.
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bank assets/liabilities among their counterparties and thus to evaluate how banks
differ in terms of their connections to other banks, we calculated for each bank
the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of the share of single interbank
assets/-liabilities to the bank’s total interbank assets/-liabilities (that are included
in our analysis).38 The maximum HHI of 1 would indicate that a bank has all its
interbank assets/-liabilities towards one single counterparty. The minimum HHI of
0 would indicate that a bank spreads its interbank assets/-liabilities as equally as
possible. The large difference between the 25% quantile (with an HHI of 0.05 and
0.11, respectively) and the 75% quantile (with an HHI of 0.28 and 0.38, respectively)
implies that results differ substantially among banks. The reason is that the central
institutions of the savings and cooperative banks concentrate their exposures on the
savings and cooperative sector, respectively, large private banks, however, do not.
It is also remarkable that banks in our network tend to spread their interbank assets
more equally than their interbank liabilities. The relative size of interbank exposures
(i.e. interbank assets/liabilities over tier-1 capital) is already quite large at the 25%
quantile, with 4% and 5%, respectively. The median of the relative size is at 12%
and 10%, respectively. This confirms that interbank exposures are a considerable
source of contagion.39
3.4 Loss given default (LGD)
As stated in the previous section, another key component for the contagion exercise
is the loss given default (LGD). We have some information about the loss rate banks
face in the event that a debtor bank defaults. More precisely, our LGD data are
38 Another method to measure the inequality would be to calculate for each bank the entropy
of the shares of single interbank exposures.
39 Generally, a single loan must not exceed 25% of a bank’s liable capital. Exceptions are,
however, exposures between banks within the associations of savings and cooperative banks,
respectively.
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assigned to the respective lender bank and not - as usually - to the debtor bank. Al-
though we do not know the LGD of the lender bank for a default of a specific debtor
bank, we know for each lender bank the average LGD of interbank exposures (at an
annual frequency). We have data on the volume of non-performing interbank loans
and on the corresponding write-downs. For each bank and each year, two figures are
provided: the amount (in euro) of interbank loans for which provisions have been
made and the amount of these provisions. We interpret the ratio of these two figures
as a realization of the stochastic LGD of a single interbank relationship, not of an
average of two or more LGDs. It is important to have realizations of LGDs of single
interbank relationships because realizations of average LGDs tend to be biased to-
wards unimodal distributions; the average of, let’s say 50 LGDs, is by virtue of the
central limit theorem approximately normally distributed, even if the distribution
of single LGDs is markedly u-shaped.40 The data are taken from the quantitative
supervisory reports collected by the Bundesbank on banks in Germany.41 Based on
this data, we can estimate the distribution of LGDs.42
Looking at Figure 3.1, we see that the empirical distribution of the LGDs is markedly
u-shaped. This characteristic and the nature of the LGDs, especially its range be-
tween 0 and 1, suggest modeling the LGD distribution with the beta distribution.
Figure 3.1 also displays the probability density function of a beta distribution with
the estimated parameters. Compared to the empirical frequency distribution, only
small deviations can be observed. Statistical tests confirm this observation. The null
hypothesis of a χ2 goodness-of-fit test on whether our data follow a beta distribu-
tion with the estimated parameters α̂ and β̂, cannot be rejected on a 5% significance
level. Choosing ten equidistant intervals and comparing the observed frequency to
40 We will discuss this topic in more detail later in this section.
41 For more details on these data see Memmel and Stein (2008).
42 Note that the LGD data and the exposure data are not fully compatible: Whereas the LGD
data refers to unconsolidated accounts and includes both the trading and the banking book,
the exposure data refers to consolidated accounts and does not include the trading book. We
believe, however, that these lacks in compatibility do not call in question the use of the data.
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the expected frequency within the intervals yields a p-value of ≈ 0.075.43
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Figure 3.1: Relative frequency of the loss given default for interbank loans, derived
from data on German private commercial banks and the central institutions of the
savings and cooperative banks. 344 observations for the period 1998-2008
Therefore, we use the beta distribution for further analysis. The density of the beta
distribution is given by
f(x) = 1
B(α, β)x
α−1(1− x)β−1 x ∈ (0, 1) (3.2)
with
B(α, β) = Γ(α)Γ(β)Γ(α + β) , (3.3)
43 The result of this test gives strong evidence that the assumed distribution is very close to the
observed distribution, as the test is very sensitive due to the large number of observations.
To illustrate the correlation between the number of observations and the sensitiveness of the
test, we run simulations with a sample randomly drawn from a beta distribution. Drawing
344 observations from a beta(0.28,0.35)-distribution 10, 000 times and testing each sample
against a beta(0.18,0.25)-distribution yields a probability of making a type II error (i.e. the
error of falsely accepting the null hypothesis) of around 18%. Repeating this exercise for only
half of the sample (i.e. drawing 172 observations each time) leads to a probability of making
a type II error of 62%. Thus, the larger the sample, the more sensitive the test becomes to
only small deviations from the distribution tested.
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where Γ(·) is the Gamma-function. The parameters α > 0 and β > 0 determine the
shape of this distribution.44 The beta distribution is especially suited to model the
LGD because (i) the domain is confined to the economic sensible interval from 0 to
1, (ii) it is highly flexible and (iii) nests other distributions.45 For instance, when
both parameters equal one, then the beta distribution becomes a uniform distribu-
tion. When both of the parameters are smaller than one, the probability density
function is u-shaped with a large portion of the probability mass close to zero and
one. For parameter values close to zero, this distribution converges to the binomial
distribution. By contrast, the density is unimodal in the case of both parameters α
and β being greater than one. For very large parameter values, it converges to the
degenerate distribution, where the entire probability mass is concentrated on one
point. The expectation and the variance of a random variable X following a beta
distribution are functions of the parameters α and β:
E(X) =: µ = α
α + β (3.4)
and
var(X) =: σ2 = αβ(α + β)2(α + β + 1) (3.5)
Given estimates for the expectation and the variance, estimators for the parame-
ters α and β are obtained by solving the equations (3.4) and (3.5) for α and β,
respectively:46
α̂ = µ̂
(
µ̂(1− µ̂)
σ̂2
− 1
)
(3.6)
44 Figure 3.6 in Appendix 2 summarizes the possible shapes of the probability density function
dependent on the parameter values.
45 See e.g. Hahn and Shapiro (1967), p. 91.
46 This procedure is called method of matching moments, see e.g. Hahn and Shapiro (1967),
p.95. We do not use maximum likelihood-estimation because there is a considerable amount
of observations which equal exactly 0 and 1 and for which, therefore, the likelihood function
is not defined.
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β̂ = (1− µ̂)
(
µ̂(1− µ̂)
σ̂2
− 1
)
(3.7)
We calculate the sample mean and variance of the distribution of the LGD for the
whole sample and different subsamples and then estimate the parameters α and β
(see Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Appendix 4). It is noteworthy that the average LGD of
savings banks being the creditors (= 58%) is well above the average LGD of the
total sample (= 38%). Cooperative banks, whose business model is comparable,
however, suffer only from a rather low LGD of 24% on average in the event they
incur losses on the interbank market. The average LGD incurred by large and inter-
nationally active banks is in between (= 45%). Furthermore, we see that the LGD
tends to be higher the larger the lender bank (measured as the lender bank’s total
assets). Irrespective of the subsample under consideration, we observe a u-shaped
distribution. We explicitly test the null hypothesis that the beta distribution is not
u-shaped, i.e. that α ≥ 1 or β ≥ 1 (see Figure 3.6). We do this by applying the
delta method.47 The result is that we can reject the null hypothesis on a 1% and 5%
significance level, respectively, in all cases. Thus, we can conclude that, irrespective
of the banking group and size of the lender banks, we can assume a u-shaped dis-
tribution of the LGD.48
As our analysis focuses mostly on large and internationally active banks in Ger-
many, it would be obvious to use this subsample to estimate the parameters of the
LGD distribution. This would give us 101 observations of realized LGDs. However,
the problem is that these LGDs are probably not only due to one single credit but
due to several credit relationships in distress. If we assume that the number of
defaulted credit relationships per bank and year follows a Poisson distribution, we
obtain for the case that exactly one debtor bank defaulted, given the bank reports
47 The details on the delta method are described in Appendix 3.
48 In the literature, however, the LGD is often modeled by using a unimodal distribution (which
implies that α > 1 and β > 1) or as a constant. Hence, these results may also have further
implications for this literature.
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non-zero write-downs, a probability of only 71%. Thus, we have the problem that
the reported LGD value of that bank is often (in about 29% of the cases) just an
average of several LGD values and the LGD distribution is therefore biased towards
unimodal distributions.49
We can mitigate this problem by including further banks in our sample for which
it is reasonable to assume that exactly one credit relationship is in distress, given
the bank reports non-zero write-downs. Thus, we include all private commercial
banks in our sample which yields a probability that exactly one single credit de-
faulted (given the bank reported non-zero write-downs) of 93%. Regional savings
banks and cooperative banks, which are generally small and medium-sized, are not
included in our sample. The reason is that we consider their position in the Ger-
man interbank market as less representative for our stability analysis because these
banks’ interbank market activities are very much characterized by relationships to
their central institutes. This is not the case for the smaller private banks. In addi-
tion, the mean LGD, which is not affected by the aforementioned problem, is quite
similar (around 45%) in the sample we chose and in the sample of the large and
internationally active banks (see Table 3.2). We therefore believe that our sample
is a balanced compromise between statistical properties (a high share of single de-
fault events) and economic fit (similarity of the banks in the contagion exercise and
estimation of the LGD distribution).
As our LGD-data are applied to situations of severe stress in the interbank market,
an important point to investigate is how LGDs change in crisis time compared to
normal times. Our data enable this as they contain the period from 1998 to 2008
and thus include the crisis year 2008. By comparing the mean LGD of the pre-crisis
years (1998-2007) to the crisis year 2008, we obtain the surprising result that the
LGDs in 2008 are, on average, lower compared to the period before. For the sample
49 The higher standard deviation of the sample used for the contagion analysis compared to the
sample of large and internationally active banks confirms our assumption, see Table 3.2.
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including all banks in 2008, we obtain 251 observations with a mean LGD of 0.27
(compared to 0.44 in pre-crisis years). The subsample of all private commercial
banks and the central institutions of the savings and cooperative banks (28 obser-
vations) yields a mean LGD of only 0.22 (compared to 0.47 in pre-crisis years). A
possible explanation for this fact is that banks become more cautious in times of
stress and e.g. demand more collateral for interbank lending. Thus, we conclude
that the potential rise of LGDs in times of severe stress (e.g. due to reduced asset
values in banks’ balance sheets) is counteracted by more precautious lending by
banks.
Our final sample of LGD observations consists of 344 observations in the period
from 1998 to 2008. Figure 3.1 shows the frequency distribution of the LGDs. Using
the sample mean µ̂ and variance σ̂2 as an estimator for the population mean and
variance, we obtain µ̂ = 0.45 and σ̂2 = 0.15. Inserting µ̂ and σ̂2 into equation (3.6)
and (3.7) yields α̂ = 0.28 and β̂ = 0.35. These parameter values indicate a u-shaped
distribution (see Figure 3.6).
As stated above, LGDs of banks can in theory be derived endogenously from their
balance sheet composition. However, we do not apply this solution because we
would have to make a lot of additional assumptions in our contagion exercise.50 For
example, we would have to make assumptions about who has to bear the losses that
arise from the bank failures. A standard assumption in a case like this is that losses
are distributed pro rata among creditors (see the clearing algorithm of Eisenberg
and Noe (2001)), which is definitely a strong assumption. For instance we find that
the mean LGD for totally unsecured interbank exposures is 64%, whereas it is only
24% for the at least partly collateralized ones. Additionally, it would be necessary
to model losses due to fire sales of assets of distressed banks. A detailed contagion
analysis with an endogenous LGD is thus not feasible since we lack the necessary
data. Besides, our data on realized LGDs suggest that the borrower banks’ balance
50 See Upper (2011) for an overview of these assumptions.
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sheet composition and other bank specific variables only explain a small fraction of
the LGD variation. We carried out a variance decomposition of the LGDs and we
find that most of the variation is due to the lender bank and due to the nature of
the relationship, i.e. the variation owing to the balance sheet composition of the
borrower bank is less important. Furthermore, endogenizing the LGD disregards the
time dimension. Upper (2011) cites the default of Bankhaus Herstatt as an example
for the observation that the LGD varies across the time horizon, i.e. the LGD de-
creases when the recovery horizon becomes longer. This observation is backed up by
Bastos (2010) who shows that the recovery rate (= 1−LGD) (though for defaulted
loans to non-financials) increases steadily with the recovery horizon. Thus, in our
opinion, the best approach is to use the u-shaped frequency distribution of the LGD
data that are derived from actual write-downs following the default of a bank.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Benchmark case
The initial assumption for our simulations is that one of the 16 banks/banking
sectors51 fails. This could trigger a cascade of failures if the ratio of tier-1 capital
to risk weighted assets of one of the creditor banks falls below 6%. The simulations
(based on a stochastic LGD) are run by drawing from a beta distribution with
parameters α = 0.28 and β = 0.35. This means that, for each exposure of a
creditor bank to a bank in distress, we randomly draw an LGD value from the beta
distribution estimated in Section 3.4. We repeat this exercise by varying the bank
that fails first from bank number 1 to 16. In contrast to simulations based on a
constant LGD, the approach with a stochastic LGD yields for each of the 16 banks
a distribution of the number of banks in distress (and not only one single number of
51 For notational convenience we will call the sectors in the following just banks.
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subsequent failures). We repeat the contagion exercise 100, 000 times for each bank,
with a different of the 16 banks starting the contagious process each time.
Figure 3.2 indicates the relative frequency of the number of bank failures, assuming
that the probability of the initial failure is the same for all of the 16 banks. The figure
shows that in 51% of the 1,600,000 simulation runs, no further failure occurs. In 8%
of the cases, however, 11 subsequent bank failures occur. On average, we observe
3.06 subsequent bank failures (i.e. 4.06 bank failures in total) in our simulations.
Figure 3.3 shows, among others, that in almost 18% of the cases more than ten banks
fail. These results indicate that there is a considerable risk of interbank contagion.
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Figure 3.2: Frequency distribution of bank failures
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Figure 3.3: Distribution function of bank failures
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3.5.2 Robustness checks
We carry out robustness checks concerning six issues. The first three checks consider
the robustness of the results to different LGD specifications. First, we investigate
if drawing from the beta distribution estimated from our dataset is a good ap-
proximation for the empirical distribution. Second, we examine if results change
significantly when using different LGD distributions for the savings and coopera-
tive sector. Third, we compare the simulation results of a stochastic LGD with
the results under the assumption of a constant LGD that is equal to the mean of
our dataset. The next two checks consider the specification of the matrix of in-
terbank exposures. With one special feature of our dataset (compared to most of
the existing literature) being the inclusion of off-balance sheet exposures, we thus
additionally run simulations excluding off-balance sheet exposures and compare the
results. In our fifth robustness check, we examine if netting of interbank assets and
liabilities between counterparties can solve the problem of contagion. Finally, we
check whether the number of bank failures is a good indicator for the stability of
the system as it is, of course, not only important how many banks fail but also
how many assets are affected by failure. Thus, as a last robustness check, we take
the balance sheet total of failing banks into account when judging the severity of
contagion.
Drawing from the empirical LGD distribution: To investigate the sensitivity
of our results with respect to the assumed distribution, we draw from the dis-
crete distribution observed by the data instead of the beta distribution. For
this purpose, one observed LGD value is randomly allocated to each exposure
of a creditor bank to a bank in distress. Compared to drawing the LGD from
a beta distribution, the results of this exercise do not differ much. The average
amount of bank failures is 4.11 (compared to 4.06 in Section 3.5.1). Further-
more, if we look at the relative frequency distribution as well as the cumulative
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distribution function of the total number of bank failures, there are virtually
no differences to the results of the simulations with the beta-distributed LGD.
We can therefore conclude that drawing from the beta distribution is a good
approximation for our observed LGD values.
Different LGD distribution for savings and cooperative banks: As our in-
terbank network consists not only of private commercial banks but also of
savings and cooperative banks, an obvious question is how results are driven
by the parameters of the beta distribution the LGDs are drawn from. As
Table 3.2 shows, LGDs corresponding to write-downs of savings and coopera-
tive banks rather resemble a beta(0.42,0.30) and beta(0.08,0.24) distribution,
respectively. Thus, we run our simulations by drawing from the respective
distributions for exposures of the savings and cooperative sector and from
the “standard” beta(0.28,0.35) distribution for the exposures of the remaining
banks.
The results of the contagion analysis differ only slightly from our benchmark
results. The overall expectation of bank failures is now at 4.24 (compared to
4.06 in the benchmark case). On the bank level, it is not clear whether the
system is more stable than in the benchmark case. The initial default of 5
of the 16 banks triggers more failures in the benchmark case; for the initial
default of 9 of the 16 banks, less failures occur in the benchmark case and
2 of the 16 banks do not trigger any further bank failure in any case. The
deviations of the expected number of bank defaults, given that one specific
bank fails are, however, rather small regarding the benchmark case and do not
exceed 0.95.
Stochastic versus constant LGD: As the standard assumption in the existing
literature is a constant LGD, we compare our simulation results generated
under the assumption of a stochastic LGD with results under the assumption
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of a constant LGD. We set the constant LGD equal to the mean of our LGD-
dataset (= 0.45, see Table 3.2). Contrary to the case of the stochastic LGD,
where we receive for each trigger bank a whole distribution of results, we obtain
for each trigger bank one single number of failures under the assumption of a
constant LGD. For only 4 of 16 initial bank failures, a constant LGD yields a
more unstable system (compared to the average number of bank failures under
the assumption of a stochastic LGD). In total, we obtain on average 2.69 bank
failures under the assumption of a constant LGD (compared to the average
of 4.06 bank failures under the assumption of a stochastic LGD). Thus, we
conclude that there is a certain risk of underestimating the effects of a bank
failure on financial stability if the distribution of the LGD is not considered.
On-balance sheet exposures only: Additionally, we examine the impact of in-
cluding off-balance sheet positions in our simulations. Most literature on in-
terbank contagion ignores off-balance sheet exposures due to data restrictions,
while we have considered them in our above simulations. We therefore repeat
the simulation exercise by excluding off-balance sheet positions. According to
our dataset, the ratio of off-balance sheet exposures to total exposures varies
considerably between banks. Table 3.1 shows that 25% of the banks hold less
than 6% of total interbank assets (3% of total interbank liabilities) off-balance
sheet. There are, however, also 25% of the banks that have a share of more
than 24% (10%) of off-balance sheet interbank assets (liabilities).
Not surprisingly, banks with a high amount of off-balance sheet positions on
their liability side trigger much less bank failures when ignoring these expo-
sures. In total, the average amount of bank failures is only 3.47 (compared to
4.06 when considering all exposures).
To elaborate the differences between the simulation results with and without
off-balance sheet exposures, we calculate the difference between the two rela-
tive frequency distributions of bank failures (see Figure 3.4). Figure 3.4 shows,
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for example, that the overall relative frequency of observing only one bank fail-
ure (i.e. contagion effects not occurring) is five percentage points higher when
only considering balance sheet exposures. For high numbers of bank defaults,
the result is reversed. For instance, the overall relative frequency of observing
12 bank failures is more than five percentage points higher when off-balance
sheet exposures are considered. Thus, Figure 3.4 shows that the inclusion of
off-balance sheet exposures leads to a higher frequency of observing extreme
events and therefore captures tail risk in a more adequate way. Therefore,
we can conclude that off-balance sheet exposures considerably contribute to
the interdependence of banks and possibly change the results of the stability
analysis in a remarkable way.
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Figure 3.4: Difference between the relative frequency distributions of bank failures
considering total exposures and on-balance sheet exposures only
Netting: As a next robustness check we examine how netting affects our results.
Thus, we assume that banks net their exposures to each other. Technically,
this means that we calculate the difference of element (i,j) and (j,i) of the
matrix of interbank exposures and change all negative entries to zero. The
outcome is a matrix of net interbank exposures.
The result is that, of course, far fewer bank failures occur. This could be
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seen easily by looking at our simulation method. A significant reduction of
interbank exposures necessarily induces less contagious bank failures. What is
surprising, however, is that contagion could still occur. Our simulations show
that in almost 13% of the 1,600,000 simulation runs, a second round effect
occurs. On average, 1.16 banks fail, which is naturally much less than in our
benchmark case (= 4.06 bank failures on average).
Balance sheet vs. number of banks Of course one could argue that the num-
ber of bank failures is not a good indicator for financial stability as also the
size of the defaulted bank matters. Hence, as an additional robustness check,
we use the ratio of assets that belong to banks that fail in reaction to the
trigger event to total assets that could theoretically fail as an indicator for
the contagious effects. A value of zero would thus mean that only the trigger
bank fails and no subsequent bank failures occur. A value of one means that
all banks in the system default.
In Figure 3.5 we compare the distribution function of the total number of bank
failures (which is the same as in Figure 3.3) with the distribution function of
the share of assets that belong to failing banks (without the trigger bank).
To make these two functions comparable, we divided the share of assets that
belong to failed banks into 16 intervals of the same size and counted the fre-
quency of results being in a particular interval. It is now easy to see that it is
e.g. more likely to observe 50% or less of the total assets of the banking system
(without trigger bank) failing compared to observe 8 or less bank failures.
Furthermore, our simulations show that on average 14% of assets in the remain-
ing banking system (without the trigger bank) are affected by bank failure.
By comparing this result to the average share of banks that fail subsequently
(= 3.05/15 ≈ 20%) we can conclude that the banks that fail in our simulations
belong on average to the smaller banks of our sample.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution function of bank failures (N) and share of assets that
belong to failing banks (BT)
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate contagion risk in the German interbank market. We
have access to a unique dataset on loss given defaults (LGDs) of interbank exposures.
Our data reveal that the frequency distribution of the LGD is markedly u-shaped,
i.e. defaults of interbank loans often imply either a low or a high loss. This markedly
u-shaped distribution stands in contrast to the assumption of a unimodal LGD dis-
tribution in the literature.
Next, we run simulations investigating the extent of potential contagion in the Ger-
man interbank market. For this purpose, we focus on 14 systematically relevant
German banks and the sectors of the savings and cooperative banks. We run simu-
lations under the assumption of a stochastic LGD by drawing from a beta distribu-
tion. The shape of the beta distribution is derived from our LGD dataset.
The result of our simulations is that contagion in the German interbank market may
happen. For the period of time under review (end 2010), we find that the contagion
exercise under the assumption of a stochastic LGD yields on average a more vul-
nerable system than under the assumption of a constant LGD. Furthermore, banks’
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off-balance sheet exposures considerably contribute to the interdependence of banks
and change the results of the stability analysis in a remarkable way.
An open question for research is to compare the loss distribution at different points
in time and to develop an indicator showing by how far the interbank market is
prone to contagious processes.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Appendix 1: Summary statistics of the interbank net-
work
p25 median p75 N
HHI(AIB) 0.05 0.10 0.28 16
HHI(LIB) 0.11 0.26 0.38 16
AIB/E 0.04 0.12 0.24 240
LIB/E 0.05 0.10 0.26 240
off-bs(AIB) 0.06 0.09 0.24 16
off-bs(LIB) 0.03 0.05 0.10 16
Table 3.1: HHI = normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index; HHI(AIB)/HHI(LIB)
= bank-specific normalized HHI of the share of single interbank exposures to total
exposures on the asset/liability side of the bank’s balance sheet; AIB/E (LIB/E) =
ratio of single interbank exposures on the asset (liability) side of the bank’s balance
sheet to its tier-1 capital; off-bs(AIB)/off-bs(LIB) = bank-specific ratio of off-balance
sheet exposures to total exposures on the asset/liability side of the bank’s balance
sheet; p25 = 0.25-percentile; p75 = 0.75-percentile; N = number of observations
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3.7.2 Appendix 2: Beta distribution
β
1
1
u-shaped
uniform
unimodalmonotonously
decreasing
monotonously
increasing
estimate
α
Figure 3.6: Shapes of the probability density function of the beta distribution
dependent on the value of the parameters α and β
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3.7.3 Appendix 3: Delta method to test for the u-shape of
the beta distribution
Our goal is to explicitly test whether the observed LGD distribution is significantly
u-shaped, i.e. we test the null hypothesis that α ≥ 1 or β ≥ 1. We carry out a
sequence of two t-tests with the two null hypotheses α ≥ 1 and β ≥ 1, respectively.
In the event that we can reject both null hypotheses, we accept the hypothesis α < 1
and β < 1. Given the same significance level in both t-tests, the significance level of
the joint hypothesis α < 1 and β < 1 is at least as strong (see Frahm et al. (2010)).
Using the delta method and the relations given in Equations (3.6) and (3.7), we
derive the asymptotic distribution of the estimates for α̂ and β̂, respectively. Using
a first-order Taylor expansion, the delta method gives us a relation between the
variance-covariance matrix of the estimators µ̂ and σ̂2, and the variance-covariance
matrix of α̂ and β̂:
V ar
 α̂
β̂
 ≈ ∇
 f1 (µ̂, σ̂2)
f2 (µ̂, σ̂2)

T
· V ar
 µ̂
σ̂2
 · ∇
 f1 (µ̂, σ̂2)
f2 (µ̂, σ̂2)
 (3.8)
with f1 (µ̂, σ̂2) = α̂ = µ̂
(
µ̂(1−µ̂)
σ̂2
− 1
)
and f2 (µ̂, σ̂2) = β̂ = (1− µ̂)
(
µ̂(1−µ̂)
σ̂2
− 1
)
.
The variance-covariance matrix of µ̂ and σ̂2 is given by:
V ar
 µ̂
σ̂2
 =
 σ2µ̂ σµ̂,σ̂2
σµ̂,σ̂2 σ
2
σ̂2
 =
 1N σ2 1Nµ3
1
N
µ3
1
N
(
µ4 − N−3N−1σ
4
)
 (3.9)
where µ3 and µ4 denote the third and fourth central moments, respectively.52 For
implementation purposes, we replace the true moments by their estimators, i.e. σ̂2,
µ̂3 and µ̂4 are given by 1N−1
∑N
i=1 (xi − µ̂)
2, 1
N
∑N
i=1 (xi − µ̂)
3 and 1
N
∑N
i=1 (xi − µ̂)
4,
52 See, for example, Mood et al. (1974), p. 228, and Zhang (2007) for the variances and covari-
ances of the estimators µ̂ and σ̂2.
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respectively.53 From the Equations (3.8) and (3.9), we see that the variances of α̂
and β̂ are linear combinations of σ2µ̂, σµ̂,σ̂2 and σ2σ̂2 :
V ar (α̂) =
(
∂f1
∂µ̂
)2
· σ2µ̂ + 2 ·
(
∂f1
∂µ̂
)
·
(
∂f1
∂σ̂2
)
· σµ̂,σ̂2 +
(
∂f1
∂σ̂2
)2
· σ2σ̂2 (3.10)
V ar
(
β̂
)
=
(
∂f2
∂µ̂
)2
· σ2µ̂ + 2 ·
(
∂f2
∂µ̂
)
·
(
∂f2
∂σ̂2
)
· σµ̂,σ̂2 +
(
∂f2
∂σ̂2
)2
· σ2σ̂2 (3.11)
Calculations based on our sample (i.e. all private commercial banks and the cen-
tral institutions of the savings and cooperative banks) yield V ar (α̂) = 0.0007 and
V ar
(
β̂
)
= 0.0013. As a next step, we use these values to calculate the test statistics
T for the t-test with the null hypothesis that α ≥ 1 and β ≥ 1. The results Tα ≈ −27
and Tβ ≈ −18 clearly show that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Thus, we can
conclude that, contrary to the common assumption of a unimodal LGD distribution
in the literature, our dataset of the LGD follows a u-shaped distribution.
53 See Hahn and Shapiro (1967), p. 48.
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3.7.4 Appendix 4: Characteristics of the LGD distribution
for different subsamples of lender banks
Sample N Loss given default Beta distribution
Mean Standard dev. α β
All banks 667 0.38 0.39 0.20*** 0.33***
Sample used for simulations 344 0.45 0.39 0.28*** 0.35***
Large and internationally active banks 101 0.45 0.32 0.62*** 0.76**
Savings banks 50 0.58 0.38 0.42*** 0.30***
Cooperative banks 222 0.24 0.37 0.08*** 0.24***
Table 3.2: Mean and standard deviation of the empirical frequency distribution of
the LGD and estimated parameters of the respective beta distribution dependent
on different samples of lender banks; N = number of observations; “Large and inter-
nationally active” includes large private commercial banks and central institutions
of the savings and cooperative banks, “sample used for simulations” includes large
and internationally active banks and all private commercial banks; **/ *** means
significantly < 1 on the 5%/1%-level.
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Size group Loss given default Beta distribution
Mean Standard dev. α β
Smallest 20% 0.26 0.40 0.05*** 0.14***
2nd quintile 0.35 0.41 0.12*** 0.22***
3rd quintile 0.38 0.40 0.17*** 0.28***
4th quintile 0.48 0.38 0.33*** 0.36***
Largest 20% 0.42 0.33 0.53*** 0.73**
Table 3.3: Mean and standard deviation of the empirical frequency distribution of
the LGD and estimated parameters of the respective beta distribution dependent
on the lender banks’ size (= lender banks’ balance sheet total). Whole sample of
667 observations; **/ *** means significantly < 1 on the 5%/1%-level.
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Chapter 4
Contagion in the interbank market
and its determinants∗
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Christoph Memmel. Opinions expressed are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
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4.1 Introduction
The ongoing financial crisis shows the importance of stress testing exercises in test-
ing the resilience of financial systems given the occurrence of shocks. These results
are important for regulatory purposes as a more unstable system has to be regulated
more strictly. Furthermore, stress testing is important for bailout decisions: If there
is a danger of one financial institution failing, some careful analysis has to be made
on the issue of what this would mean for the rest of the financial system. To create
meaningful stress testing exercises, one has to think about various channels through
which financial distress could spread from one financial institution to another.
In many studies, the interbank market has been identified as one of these channels.
To be more precise, the failure of one bank can trigger the failure of its creditor banks
due to their direct exposures. This is the case if the write-downs on the exposures to
the failed bank cannot be absorbed by the creditor banks’ capital buffers. If one of
these creditor banks also fails, there could be another round of bank failures. This
procedure can lead to several rounds of bank failures and is therefore often denoted
as “domino effects”. Thus, one obvious stress testing exercise is to investigate how
many subsequent bank failures occur as a consequence of direct exposures in the
event that one bank fails for some exogenous reason.
Of course, there are other transmission channels of contagion, e.g. due to liquidity
problems that result out of asset fire sales, refinancing problems because of dried
up interbank markets or information contagion. Here, however, we exclusively deal
with contagion effects due to direct interbank exposures. We concentrate on this
channel because we have detailed data about German banks’ mutual credit expo-
sures at our disposal. This enables us to simulate the failure of one of the large and
internationally active German banks and to investigate the effects on other German
banks that arise from direct interbank linkages.
This analysis can be carried out for all banks in a banking system for a certain
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point in time. Repeating this exercise for different points in time makes it possible
to judge how the stability of the financial system (in terms of the danger of a domino
effect) evolves over time. This could give regulators important information on how
e.g. certain regulatory actions affect the stability of the financial system.
Our aim is to condense the results of the contagion exercises into one indicator for
each point in time and then to investigate its determinants. Investigating the de-
terminants of this indicator can help in two ways: First, determinants derived from
theoretical considerations can be empirically validated and their importance can be
assessed. Second, on the assumption that all interbank markets are similar, one can
transfer the results obtained here to interbank markets for which there is no detailed
data available.
Our analysis consists of three steps. First, we investigate the danger and the extent
of contagion for each point in time from the first quarter of 2008 to the second
quarter of 2011. Besides mutual exposures, a very important input variable for the
simulations is the loss given default (LGD), i.e. the percentage of the interbank
exposure that actually has to be written off in case of default. Thus, a LGD of
0% means that there are no write-downs (e.g. because of good collateral), a LGD
of 100% means a complete write-down of the exposures in the event of failure. In
most existing studies of contagion in the interbank market, an exogenously given
and constant LGD is used. Thus, the outcome of these contagion studies crucially
depends on the value of the LGD. We have, however, a unique dataset of actually
realized LGD available. Thus, following Chapter 3 we use a different approach, i.e.
we draw randomly from a beta distribution that is fitted to the empirical frequency
distribution of our dataset. Hence, our simulations are based on a stochastic in-
stead of a constant LGD. As a robustness check, we then compare these results
with results under the assumption of a constant LGD that equals the mean of our
dataset. It turns out that for rather stable systems, the assumption of a constant
LGD systematically yields a lower number of bank failures than the assumption of a
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stochastic LGD (and vice versa). We use the distribution functions of bank failures
for each point in time (which can be compared by using the concept of stochastic
dominance) as well as the expectation of bank failures as an indicator to investigate
how financial stability evolves over time. It turns out that the system becomes less
vulnerable to direct domino effects over the time span considered.
Second, we empirically check whether the information of a whole loss distribution
can be sufficiently summarized in a single indicator. Our metric is by how far an in-
dicator can predict whether or not the loss distribution of a given quarter dominates
the loss distribution of another quarter, i.e. the comparison of a whole distribution
(by using the concept of stochastic dominance) is condensed into a single indicator.
In this context, we use the expected number of failures as the indicator. The dis-
criminatory power of this indicator proves to be sufficiently high.
Third, having chosen this indicator, we investigate its determinants. Following the
literature on interbank contagion, we suggest four determinants: the capital in the
system, the percentage of interbank assets relative to total assets, the loss given
default and – as the really systemic measure – the degree of equality in the distribu-
tion of bilateral interbank exposures (measured by the entropy of the matrix). We
find that the coefficients for the four determinants have the expected sign and are
all significant. More important, they can explain more than 80% of the variation of
the indicator.
This chapter is structured as follows: In Section 4.2, we provide a short overview
of the literature in this field and point out our contribution. Then, in Section 4.3,
we describe the data, explain the contagion algorithm and show our results under
the assumption of a constant and a stochastic LGD. In Section 4.4, we investigate
if the expected number of bank failures is a suitable indicator for the stability of
the interbank market and, in Section 4.5, we explore the indicator’s determinants.
Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Literature
This chapter contributes to three strands of the literature. First, our method for
simulating domino effects is similar to the empirical contagion analysis already ap-
plied to many countries (see e.g. Upper and Worms (2004) for Germany, Mistrulli
(2011) for Italy or van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) for the Netherlands). Upper
(2011) provides a comprehensive overview of this topic. Our approach, however,
differs from this “standard approach” as we do not model the LGD as constant but
as stochastic (see Chapter 3). To be able to evaluate how the vulnerability of the
system to interbank contagion evolves over time, we use a time series of 14 quarters.
A similar approach has been used by Degryse and Nguyen (2007). They investigate
contagion in the Belgian interbank market over a ten years period ending in 2002.
Another related paper in this context is Cont et al. (2010). They use a detailed
dataset on exposures in the Brazilian interbank market and investigate by using a
contagion exercise how the stability of the Brazilian banking system evolves from
mid 2007 to the end of 2008. Though the basic simulation mechanism of these two
papers is similar to ours, there are various differences to our approach (e.g. the de-
sign of the shock, the way the loss given default is modeled and the way the stability
of the system is evaluated).
Second, we develop an indicator of the interbank market’s resilience. Cont et al.
(2010) summarize their simulation results by developing an indicator of the systemic
importance of financial institutions for different points in time. Like these authors,
we have detailed information on direct interbank exposures. Additionally, we use a
dataset on actually realized loss given default (LGD) on the interbank market. Thus,
contrary to market-based indicators that are, for example, developed by Acharya
et al. (2010), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and Huang et al. (2011), our stability
indicator relies on detailed supervisory data.
Third, the aim of this chapter is to find out which simple indicators of a financial sys-
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tem help to explain our (more sophisticated) stress testing results. Simple indicators
would be much more convenient for regulators to calculate and interpret compared
to more sophisticated ones. In this context, Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) study
the effects of simple indicators (such as bank size and interbank lending / borrow-
ing) on the systemic importance of banks. They find that these simple indicators
contribute well to the explanation of the more sophisticated systemic risk measures
of banks. Degryse and Nguyen (2007) find that a move from a complete structure of
claims towards a multiple money center structure within the Belgian banking sector
(measured by the share of domestic interbank exposures of large banks to total do-
mestic interbank exposures) as well as its increasing internationalization (measured
by the share of total domestic interbank exposures to total interbank exposures) re-
duced the danger of contagion in the domestic interbank market. Additionally, the
banks’ capitalization is identified as a crucial determinant of interbank contagion.
Cont et al. (2010) find that the size of interbank liabilities as well as some structural
features of the interbank network (measured by newly created indicators) have an
impact on financial stability.
The selection of the main determinants of our financial stability indicator is based
on literature that focuses on theoretical simulations of interbank contagion. In this
context, Nier et al. (2007) investigate, among other things, how the variation of
banks’ capital ratio, the size of banks’ interbank exposures as well as banks’ connec-
tivity affects the stability of the system. Gai and Kapadia (2010) show, among other
things, the impact of banks’ connectivity and capital ratio on financial stability. The
theoretical simulations in Chapter 2 examine the impact of banks’ equity ratio, the
amount of interbank lending, the loss given default and the degree of equality in how
banks spread their claims on the stability of the network. In addition to theoretical
simulations, the model of Allen and Gale (2000) also shows that it is important to
consider the network structure of the banking system for the stability analysis. We
test for four determinants of the vulnerability to interbank contagion: banks’ cap-
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italization, interbank lending, the loss given default and how equally banks spread
their claims among counterparties. The empirical investigations in this chapter con-
firm, among others, the theoretical simulations of Chapter 2, which show that a
higher capital ratio, less interbank lending within the system, a lower loss given
default and a more equal distribution of interbank claims (given not too extreme
parameter values) in a complete network yield a more stable system.
4.3 Simulation exercise
4.3.1 Data
Our simulation exercise starts with the exogenous failure of one bank within our
sample.54 Given the matrix of mutual interbank exposures and a loss given default
(LGD) assigned to each of these exposures, we calculate the losses (i.e. the write-
downs) of the creditor banks. If the tier-1 capital ratio of one of the creditor banks
falls below 6%, which is the critical threshold according to the Basel III capital
requirements as well as the EBA stress tests in 2010 (and implicitly in 2009), this
bank will also become distressed and fail. If at least one bank fails after the failure
of the trigger bank, there will be a next round in which the losses of the creditor
banks are calculated. This contagious process comes to an end if there is a round
with no new bank failures.
Thus, the required data for this analysis are, first, information on banks’ capital
as well as their risk weighted assets, second, data on banks’ mutual exposures and
third, data on the LGD. Our sample consists of 14 large and internationally active
German banks as well as the aggregate sectors of the savings and cooperative banks,
for which we have data from the first quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2011.55
54 For a general discussion of the round-by-round algorithm applied in this chapter see Upper
(2011). For a detailed description of the contagion algorithm see Chapter 3
55 For simplicity, these 16 entities are just called banks in the following.
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The banks’ equity (tier-1 capital) and their risk weighted assets (RWA) are taken
from the supervisory data storage system BAKIS.56 Data on the bilateral exposures
are taken from the German credit register, where all bilateral exposures are collected
provided that they exceed (or are equal to) a threshold of EUR 1.5m.57
To get a first overview of the data, Figures 4.1 to 4.3 show how key characteristics
of the banking system under consideration evolve over time. Figure 4.1 shows that
the capitalization of the banking system increased substantially over time from an
average of about 8.5% tier-1 capital relative to risk weighted assets in the first
quarter of 2008 to more than 12% in the second quarter of 2011. This is due
to an increase in banks’ tier-1 capital on the one hand and a reduction in risk
weighted assets on the other hand. Thus, banks raised their capital buffers during
this time span to improve their resilience to potential shocks. Additionally, the
weighted share of interbank assets (and thus the size of interbank linkages) relative
to the sum of banks’ balance sheet totals tends to decrease over time, as Figure 4.2
shows.58 Following an average of more than 13.5% of interbank assets in the third
quarter of 2009, the ratio decreased to 11.5% in the second quarter of 2011. The
decreasing ratio of interbank assets to total assets shows a decreasing amount of
interbank assets rather than an increase in banks’ balance sheet totals. To see how
the degree of equality in the distribution of interbank exposures evolves over time,
we calculate the entropy of the matrix of interbank linkages. Entropy methods
have been used in the literature on interbank contagion mostly to fill in missing
data into the matrix of bilateral interbank exposures.59 The underlying assumption
of this method is that banks spread these exposures as equally as possible among
56 For more information about the supervisory data in Germany see Memmel and Stein (2008).
57 For more information on the German credit register see Schmieder (2006).
58 One has to bear in mind that we only consider interbank assets within the system. As we
consider large and internationally active banks, it is quite likely that some banks will have
most of their interbank exposures abroad. However, looking at aggregate interbank lending
(of domestic banks) to all banks (including foreign banks) over the time span considered yields
the same result, i.e. a decrease in the share of interbank assets to total assets.
59 See e.g. Upper and Worms (2004)
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their counterparties, which is equivalent to maximizing the entropy of the matrix of
interbank exposures. In this chapter, we use this approach the other way round. As
the whole matrix of bilateral exposures is available, we calculate the entropy of the
matrix as a measure of how equally/unequally exposures are distributed. Figure 4.3
shows that the entropy of the matrix of mutual exposures has steadily decreased,
which means that interbank exposures tend to be distributed more unequally over
time. The network we consider is almost complete, i.e. there are no more than two
off-diagonal zero entries in the 16× 16 matrix of interbank exposures for each point
in time.
t E (total) RWA (total) BT (total) AIB (total) E/RWA
1 2008q1 226392126 2661052513 7591952739 950399701 0.08507616
2 2008q2 231148410 2664972563 7334094491 996857275 0.08673576
3 2008q3 238451362 2674085338 7432661601 988879728 0.08917119
4 2008q4 242932847 2630837875 7759258998 1011100839 0.09234049
5 2009q1 250345959 2736924775 7646418427 1039281005 0.0914698
6 2009q2 257010123 2597189100 7438244643 1012658571 0.09895703
7 2009q3 260218825 2564425288 7342683988 999623078 0.10147257
8 2009q4 259373835 2477214488 7062043039 939226086 0.10470383
9 2010q1 257484207 2495686400 7194756366 958583071 0.1031717
10 2010q2 257518540 2474581888 7613731338 944147532 0.10406548
11 2010q3 256161898 2374964025 7539271941 906366437 0.10785928
12 2010q4 266711996 2351628138 7855233533 883118117 0.11341589
13 2011q1 269035496 2283762688 7263870218 860532504 0.11780361
14 2011q2 272434520 2252468913 7160338568 823572618 0.12094929
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Figure 4.1: Development of the weighted tier-1 capital ratio of all 16 entities
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3 2008q3 238451362 2674085338 7432661601 988879728 0.08917119
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5 2009q1 250345959 2736924775 7646418427 1039281005 0.0914698
6 2009q2 257010123 2597189100 7438244643 1012658571 0. 9895703
7 2009q3 260218825 2564425288 7342683988 999623078 0.10147257
8 2009q4 259373835 2477214488 7062043039 939226086 0.10470383
9 2010q1 257484207 2495686400 7194756366 958583071 0.1031717
10 2010q2 257518540 2474581888 7613731338 944147532 0.10406548
11 2010q3 256161898 2374964025 7539271941 906366437 0.10785928
12 2010q4 266711996 2351628138 7855233533 883118117 0.11341589
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Figure 4.2: Development of the ratio of interbank assets within the system to total
assets of all 16 entities
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Figure 4.3: Development of the entropy of the matrix of interbank exposures
Furthermore, we need data on the loss given default for our contagion exercise. In
this context, we use LGD-data from the quantitative supervisory reports for banks
in Germany, where once a year each bank had to report the actual provisions on
interbank loans as well as the total volume of the loan for which provisions have been
made. As in Chapter 3, we use the subsample of all German private commercial
banks plus the central institutions of the savings and cooperative banks. This gives
us an empirical frequency distribution with a mean of 0.45 and a standard deviation
of 0.39. Using this information and equations (3.6) and (3.7), we can approximate
the empirical frequency distribution by a (markedly u-shaped) beta distribution
with parameters α = 0.28 and β = 0.35. Figure 4.4 shows the empirical frequency
distribution of the actually observed LGD-data as well as the fitted beta distribution.
To incorporate the LGD as an explanatory variable into our analysis of the main
determinants of financial stability (see Section 4.5), we carry out the contagion
exercises for different LGD distributions: We change the parameters α and β of
the beta distribution (which can be easily calculated dependent on the mean and
variance of the distribution) so as to have expected LGDs of 25%, 35%, 55% and
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65%, respectively.60 The different beta distributions we use for our simulations are
shown in Figure 4.7 in Appendix 1.
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Figure 4.4: Empirical frequency distribution of the LGD data as well as the fitted
beta distribution
4.3.2 Stochastic loss given default
The simulation exercise is carried out using the round-by-round algorithm described
in Section 4.3.1. At first, all simulations are run by assuming that the LGD is
stochastic and follows the distribution shown in Figure 4.4, i.e. for each exposure
to a failing bank, we randomly draw a LGD from the estimated beta distribution
with parameters α = 0.28 and β = 0.35. To be more precise, we let one bank (e.g.
bank i) at a particular time (e.g. time t) fail, assign a randomly drawn LGD to
each interbank exposure and calculate how many banks fail in total due to domino
effects. We repeat that exercise (i.e. calculating the consequences of the failure of
bank i at time t) 100,000 times in total, each time randomly drawing a new set of
60 It is straightforward to adjust the variance of the beta distribution: In order to preserve the
structure of its density function, the ratio of the variance of a binomially distributed random
variable and a beta distributed random variable with the same mean should be constant, i.e.
µ1(1−µ1)
σ21
= µ2(1−µ2)
σ22
with µi(1 − µi) being the variance of a binomially distributed variable
with mean µi and σ2i being the variance of a beta distributed variable with mean µi. With
µ being the expected value of the LGD distribution, we can thus calculate the parameters
α = µ · 0.65 and β = (1− µ) · 0.65.
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LGDs from the beta distribution with estimated parameters. As a next step, we let
another bank in the system fail (e.g. bank j) and calculate, again 100,000 times,
the number of bank failures. By repeating this exercise for each of the 16 banks in
the sample, we obtain a total of 1,600,000 results of bank failures for time t. We
aggregate these results in order to receive an empirical frequency distribution and the
respective cumulative distribution function of bank failures. As we have data for 14
points in time, we can generate 14 cumulative distribution functions that indicate
the stability of the banking system in each respective quarter. Additionally, we
calculate the overall mean of bank failures for each quarter. As we also investigate
the impact of the loss given default on the expected number of bank failures, we
repeat this contagion exercise for each point in time four times, each time drawing
from another LGD distribution shown in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution function of bank failures for the first quarter of 2008 to
the second quarter of 2011 (stochastic LGD)
Figure 4.5 shows the simulation results for the first quarter of 2008 to the second
quarter of 2011 under the assumption that the LGD follows the beta distribution
shown in Figure 4.4 (i.e. the distribution that is derived from our LGD-dataset). The
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cumulative distribution function of the first quarter of 2008 (2008q1), for example,
indicates that, under the assumption that each of the 16 entities fails with equal
probability, the probability of observing 13 or fewer bank failures is about 10%. The
probability of observing exactly 14 bank failures is around 80%. Thus, in the vast
majority of cases in the first quarter of 2008, more than 13 banks fail (including
the bank that fails first). This yields a rather unstable system. Looking at the
cumulative distribution function of the second quarter of 2011 (2011q2), we find a
different result. Here, the probability of observing just one bank failure (which is
the bank that failed exogenously) is almost 72%. In only 15% of the cases more
than 3 banks fail in total. Thus, in 2011q2, our results yield a considerably more
stable system compared to previous quarters. One interesting result we obtain is
that there is a substantial increase in system stability after the third quarter of 2009
(2009q3).
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Figure 4.6: Overall expectation of the number of bank failures for the period from
the first quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2011 (stochastic and constant LGD)
In addition to the cumulative distribution function, we characterize the stability
of the system for each point in time by one single number: the expectation of the
total number of bank defaults if one of the 16 entities fails. Thus, we calculate the
average number of bank defaults of all 1,600,000 simulation runs (again under the
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assumption that the loss given default follows the beta distribution shown in Figure
4.4) for each point in time. Figure 4.6 shows the development of this expectation over
time. The highest value is reached in the first quarter of 2009 with an expectation of
more than 14 bank defaults. In the following quarters the expectation continuously
decreases to fewer than 3 bank defaults in the second quarter of 2011. However, one
has to bear in mind that our simulations only consider direct contagion via domino
effects. Our simulations do not consider shocks on banks’ assets other than direct
interbank exposures. Thus, our simulations do not take into account, for example,
risks due to sovereign default and therefore show a very stable system in the first
and second quarter of 2011.
4.3.3 Stochastic versus constant loss given default
As a robustness check, we repeat the contagion exercise by assuming a constant
LGD which equals the mean of our empirical distribution (= 45%). Thus, we assign
the same LGD to each interbank exposure. This procedure yields, in contrast to the
stochastic case, only one number of bank failures given that bank i fails at time t.
Again, for each point in time we let each of the 16 entities fail and derive a number
of subsequent bank failures. And similarly to the case of the stochastic LGD, we can
summarize our results for each point in time by a cumulative distribution function
as well as the overall average number of bank failures.61
Figure 4.6 shows that there is, for most points in time, not very much difference in
the overall expectation of the number of bank failures between simulations with a
stochastic LGD and a constant LGD. On the bank level, however, there can be a
considerable variation in the results. For each of the 16 entities, we calculate the
results of the 14 points in time, which yields 224 observations. In 16% of these 224
61 The cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) under the assumption of a constant LGD look,
in terms of the relative positions of the different CDFs, very similar to the CDFs in Figure
4.5.
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observations, there is a deviation of more than 4 bank failures, in more than 40%
of the cases there is a deviation of more than one bank failure. The direction of
the deviation, however, varies. In 52% of the cases, a constant LGD yields a more
unstable system, in 39% of the cases, a constant LGD yields a more stable system
and in the remaining 9% of the cases there is no difference (this only happens when
there are no further bank failures in both cases).
A straightforward question in this context is what drives the result regarding whether
a constant LGD yields a more stable or unstable system. Visual inspection suggests
that the total number of bank failures, given that bank i fails at time t, is a crucial
factor. Thus, letDi,t be a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the failure of
bank i at time t yields a less stable system under the assumption of a constant LGD
and zero otherwise.62 In addition, let AVi,t be the average of the expected number
of bank failures (following the failure of bank i at time t) under the assumption of a
stochastic LGD and the respective number of bank failures under the assumption of
a constant LGD. We model the probability that the assumption of a constant LGD
will lead to a less stable system with a logit model, using AVi,t as the explanatory
variable.
Pr (Di,t = 1) =
1
1 + exp [−(β0 + β1AVi,t)]
(4.1)
Table 4.1 shows that we obtain the highly significant result that a higher average
number of bank failures increases the probability that a constant LGD will yield a
higher number of bank failures compared to a stochastic LGD.
As a robustness check we use a standard OLS regression to investigate the rela-
tionship between the discrepancy of the results under a constant and a stochastic
LGD and the average number of bank failures. Let CSi,t be the difference between
the number of failures under the assumption of a constant LGD and the expected
62 In this estimation, the cases where the constant and the stochastic LGD yield the same results
are included (Di,t takes on the value zero in these cases). As a robustness check we estimate
the model without these data. However, there is hardly any change in the results.
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number of failures under the assumption of a stochastic LGD (following the failure
of bank i at time t). This yields the following equation:
CSi,t = β0 + β1AVi,t + εi,t (4.2)
The last column of Table 4.1 shows that a higher average number of bank failures
indicates a higher value of CSi,t. The interpretation depends on the sign of CSi,t.
For a low average number of bank failures, the difference is negative, i.e. a stochastic
LGD yields a more unstable system and an increase in AVi,t moves CSi,t towards
zero. For a high average number of bank failures, the difference is positive, i.e. a
constant LGD yields a more unstable system and an increase in AVi,t also increases
the difference between the results of a constant and a stochastic LGD. Again, all
results are highly significant.
Variable Logit D CS
AVi,t 0.28*** 0.23***
(0.03) (0.02)
constant -2.38*** -2.50***
(0.34) (0.33)
Nobs 224 224
(Pseudo) R2 0.30 0.20
AUR 0.76 -
Table 4.1: Logit regression with Di,t being a dummy variable indicating that
the failure of bank i at time t yields more bank failures under the assumption of a
constant LGD compared to a stochastic LGD, and AVi,t corresponding to the average
number of bank failures with a constant and a stochastic LGD. OLS regression with
CSi,t being the difference of the (expected) number of failures under the assumption
of a constant and a stochastic LGD. Robust standard errors. AUR gives the area
under the ROC-curve; *** denotes significance at 1%-level.
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Intuitively, if the system is rather unstable (e.g. due to a low tier-1 capital ratio of
banks), a constant LGD leads to a higher average number of bank defaults than a
stochastic LGD as it is not possible in the constant case to randomly draw a very
low LGD that avoids contagion from one bank to another. In contrast, if the system
is rather stable, a constant LGD leads to a lower average number of bank defaults
compared to a stochastic LGD as it is not possible in the constant case to randomly
draw a very high LGD.
Empirically, we find that the LGD is not rather constant, but markedly u-shaped
(see Figure 4.4), i.e. the LGD is often low or high, but little probability mass is
centered around the expectation of the distribution in the middle. Thus, the sim-
plifying assumption of a constant LGD cannot be justified by empirical data, which
has important implications for our contagion exercise. Under the assumption of a
constant LGD, one tends to overestimate the extent of contagion in unstable sys-
tems and to underestimate it in rather stable systems. In Chapter 3, we investigate
the extent of contagion for one point in time (the fourth quarter of 2010). In this
context, we also compare the assumptions of a constant LGD and a stochastic LGD
and find that the assumption of a constant LGD underestimates the extent of con-
tagion. This is in line with the results of this section as Figure 4.5 shows a rather
stable system in 2010q4.
4.4 Development of an indicator
4.4.1 Stochastic dominance
As a next step, to evaluate our results from Section 4.3.2 in more detail, we have to
find a measure that allows us to compare the different distributions (and not only
numbers) of bank failures over time. One concept that makes this possible without
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many assumptions is stochastic dominance.63 This measure can be e.g. used in
decision theory if a preference relation between two assets with stochastic returns
has to be found. In our case, we can also form preference relations by assuming that
fewer bank failures are preferred to more bank failures. In this context, assume that
there are two cumulative distribution functions F (·) and G(·). The distribution F (·)
is said to have first-order stochastic dominance over the function G(·) if
F (x) ≥ G(x) (4.3)
for all x and strict inequality for at least one x.64 If there is first-order stochastic
dominance, every individual preferring less bank failures to more bank failures and
having the choice between two distributions, prefers the distribution that dominates
the other one according to the definition given by Equation (4.3).
There are two main drawbacks of the concept of first-order stochastic dominance:
First, there is no statement possible by how far one distribution is preferred to an-
other (dominated) distribution and, second, the comparison is not complete in a
mathematical sense, i.e. there is not always a dominance relationship between two
distributions.
The results of the analysis of first-order stochastic dominance are shown in Appendix
2. The matrix that describes the results confirms our findings in Section 4.3.2. The
most favorable distribution function of bank defaults is given in the second quarter
of 2011. This distribution dominates the distribution function of all other points in
time. The distribution function of the first quarter of 2009 does not dominate any
63 See Bawa (1975) and Schmid and Trede (2006), chapter 8, for more information about the
concept of stochastic dominance.
64 Note, however, that the definition of stochastic dominance in this paper is not exactly the
same as the standard definition which is based on the assumption that the respective utility
function is increasing (and not decreasing as in this paper). However, we can redefine the
utility function in a way that it is dependent on the number of solvent banks y := 16−x (with
x being the number of failed banks). Thus, it follows that ∂u∂y > 0. Using this assumption, the
condition for first-order stochastic dominance is, that F (·) dominates G(·) if F (y) ≤ G(y) for
all y and strict inequality for at least one y. Redefining each CDF by making it dependent
on y and using this standard condition for stochastic dominance yields the same results.
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other quarter but is dominated by 12 other quarters. This result indicates that in
2009q1 the distribution function of bank defaults was quite unfavorable. However,
there is a dominance relationship between different points in time in only 70 of the
91 cases.65
Using a higher order stochastic dominance, one can mitigate the problem of com-
pleteness – at the expense of imposing additional assumptions.66
4.4.2 Whole distribution versus expectation
It is now possible (for most points in time) to compare the distribution functions
of bank failures. To analyze the main determinants for the stability of the financial
system it would, however, be much easier to use single numbers as an indicator of
financial stability. In the end, the question of whether a single number is suitable
to condense the information of a whole distribution needs to be answered with
empirical data. Our aim is to show that a statement based on the comparison
of two distribution functions is more or less equivalent to the comparison of the
expectations. To do so, we proceed as follows: Having 14 different distribution
functions (one for each quarter), we can make 91 (=14*13/2) bilateral comparisons,
i.e. we exclude comparisons with itself and double counts. Let F and G be the
cumulative distribution functions of time t1 and t2, respectively. Whenever there is a
(first-order) dominance relationship between F and G (irrespective of the direction),
65 We also calculated the relationships of first-order stochastic dominance for the distributions
of bank failures under the assumption of a constant LGD. In this case, we can even compare
87 of the 91 cases using the concept of first-order stochastic dominance.
66 We additionally investigated the second-order dominance relationships. To be able to do this,
we have to redefine each CDF to make it dependent on the number of solvent banks y. Under
the assumption that individuals prefer more solvent banks to less solvent banks and are risk
averse (∂u∂y > 0 and
∂2u
∂y2 < 0 ), F (·) is preferred to G(·) if
y∫
−∞
F (t) dt ≤
y∫
−∞
G (t) dt for all
y and strict inequality for at least one y. However, the number of dominance relationships
(= 72) only slightly increases compared to first-order stochastic dominance.
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the indicator variable Dt1,t2 takes on the value one. The variable ∆Ft1,t2 := abs(Ft1−
Ft2) is the corresponding absolute difference in the expected number of bank failures.
We model the probability of an existing dominance relationship with a logit model
and explain this probability with the absolute difference ∆Ft1,t2 .
Pr (Dt1,t2 = 1) =
1
1 + exp [−(β0 + β1∆Ft1,t2)]
(4.4)
We expect a positive coefficient for β1: the larger the absolute difference in the
expected number of bank failures, the more likely the existence of a dominance
relationship. As a robustness check and to account for possible non-linearities, we
also include the squared term ∆F 2 in the model. The results are displayed in Table
4.2.
Variable Logit D Logit D
∆F 0.45*** 0.99***
(0.13) (0.35)
∆F 2 -0.06**
(0.03)
constant -0.50 -1.14**
(0.40) (0.55)
Nobs 91 91
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.27
AUR 0.85 0.82
Table 4.2: Logit regression where Dt1,t2 is a dummy variable indicating (first-order)
stochastic dominance between the distributions in t1 and t2 or vice versa, and ∆F
is the corresponding absolute difference in the expected number of bank failures.
Robust standard errors. AUR gives the area under the ROC-curve; ** and ***
denote significance at the 5% and 1%-level, respectively.
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As expected, the coefficient of the variable ∆F is positive and highly significant.
Additionally, to evaluate the discriminatory power of the model, we calculate the
area under the ROC-curve (AUR). The ROC (receiver operating characteristic)-
curve plots the type 1 error rate of the model against one minus the type 2 error
rate for different thresholds. The better the predictive power of the model, the lower
the type 2 error rate for a given type 1 error rate and the higher the area under
the ROC-curve. In the case of our model, the AUR is high with 0.85. Therefore,
we conclude that, in this case, the comparison of two distribution functions on the
one hand and the comparison of the two expectations on the other hand yields
rather similar results, i.e. the expected number of failures is a suitable indicator for
measuring the vulnerability of a banking system to contagion. There is no use in
including a quadratic term as done in the robustness check: The AUR is then even
lower than in the case without this quadratic term.
4.5 Determinants
As shown in the previous section, the information included in the whole distribution
can be summarized in one number without much loss of information. This single
number is the expectation of bank failures F and will be our indicator for the
vulnerability of the (German) interbank market. Drehmann and Tarashev (2011)
show that highly sophisticated measures of systemic risk contribution can be well
approximated by more objective figures like size and interbank lending. Following
this idea, we try to replicate our indicator using relatively easily available measures.
Following the results of the theoretical simulations in Chapter 2, we look at four
different determinants: the capital ratio CR, the extent of interbank lending IBL,
the average loss given default LGD and the structure of the interbank market ENT ,
measured by the entropy of the matrix of bilateral interbank exposures. As outlined
in Section 4.3.1, the entropy is a statistical tool that measures the degree of equality;
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the higher the entropy, the higher the degree of equality. Theoretical considerations
as laid down in Chapter 2 argue that a rather complete system ceteris paribus
becomes (for not too extreme parameter values) more stable the more equalized its
linkages are, i.e. the higher the entropy is.
We run the following linear regression:
Ft,i,j = β0 + β1CRt,i,j + β2IBLt,i,j + β3LGDt,i,j + β4ENTt,i,j + εt,i,j (4.5)
where CRt,i,j is the tier-1 capital ratio of the banking system at time t excluding
bank i, which is originally and exogenously in distress. Accordingly, IBLt,i,j is the
cumulated interbank lending of the banking system over the aggregate total assets
of the system at time t excluding bank i. ENTt,i,j is the entropy of the matrix of
bilateral interbank exposures at time t, excluding bank i. Figures 4.1 to 4.3 show the
evolution over time for the three determinants (in contrast to our regressors, these
figures show the determinants for the whole financial system). On the one hand, the
capital ratio in the system has increased significantly and interbank lending tends to
decrease; these two developments are believed to make the system more stable. On
the other hand, the exposures have become less equally distributed, which should
lead to a less stable system.
By creating variables in the way described above, we not only have variation in
the time dimension (as shown in Figures 4.1 to 4.3) but also in the cross-section
(i.e. between banks). The descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.3 indicate that the
endogenous variable Ft,i,j and two exogenous variables are characterized by a sub-
stantial part of cross-sectional variation. This enables us to apply a panel analysis.
The index j = 1, ..., 5 denotes the different average LGDs, ranging from 25% to 65%
in steps of 10 percentage points. As the variable LGD is set exogenously, we do not
report its mean and standard deviation in Table 4.3.
113
Variable Mean Stand. dev. Between variation (Percentage)
F 9.08 5.00 15%
CR (%) 10.12 1.11 1%
IBL (%) 12.83 1.51 74%
LGD - -
ENT 4.21 0.10 39%
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics (for the case of an average LGD of 45%). The
column “Between variation” gives the between variance of the given variable as a
share of the total variance.
Table 4.4 shows the results of the linear regression (4.5) with bank dummies to
account for possible bank-specific effects. The results are in line with expectations.
We find that an increase in the capital ratio of the whole system by one percentage
point reduces the expected number of failing banks by more than four. This result is
highly significant. The exposure to the interbank market is also of great importance.
When interbank lending (relative to total assets) increases by one percentage point,
the number of expected failures will go up by 1.8 banks. When the LGD increases
by one percentage point, then the number of expected bank failures will go up by
0.14. The capital ratio and interbank lending – although calculated for the whole
system – are, after all, the (weighted) average of the single ratios, i.e. these ratios are
bank-specific measures by nature. The LGD is even specific to each borrower-lender-
relationship. By contrast, the entropy of the system is a truly systemic measure.
As mentioned above, it shows how equally interbank lending is distributed in the
banking system. A higher entropy means that banks spread their interbank assets
/ liabilities more equally among other banks in the system. The simulation results
in Chapter 2 indicate that for a rather complete network a more equal distribution
of interbank lending, i.e. a higher entropy of the matrix of interbank lending, leads
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(for not too extreme parameter values like an extremely low capitalization of banks)
to a more resilient system.
Variable Coefficient Stand. Dev.
CR -4.02*** 0.145
IBL 1.81*** 0.127
LGD 0.14*** 0.005
ENT -24.13*** 2.289
constant 130.07*** 10.618
Adj R2 0.813
Nobs 1120
Table 4.4: Results of the regression Ft,i,j = β0 +β1CRt,i,j+β2IBLt,i,j+β3LGDt,i,j+
β4ENTt,i,j + εt,i,j, where Ft,i,j is the expected number of failing banks in quarter t
given that bank i fails exogenously and the LGD is drawn from beta distribution
j. Pooled OLS regression with dummies for each bank and robust standard errors;
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level
Indeed, we find that an increase in entropy (= a more equal distribution of inter-
bank lending) leads to a reduction in the expected number of bank failures.67 As the
network we consider is almost complete (for each point in time there are no more
than two off-diagonal zero-entries in the 16× 16 matrix of interbank liabilities) and
parameter values are not too extreme (banks’ capitalization is not extremely low
and the LGD is not extremely high), our empirical results confirm the theoretical
simulation results in Chapter 2. These results are also in line with the theoretical
findings of Allen and Gale (2000), who show that a complete network (with maxi-
mum entropy of the matrix of mutual exposures) is more stable than an incomplete
but perfectly interconnected network (with a lower entropy of the matrix of mutual
67 This finding is in contrast to Figure 4.3, which shows a more unequal distribution of claims
over time although the stability of the system increased. However, it is quite likely that the
negative effect of a decreasing entropy is outweighed by the effect of banks’ capitalization and
interbank lending.
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exposures). The bank dummies also have a high explanatory power. All of them
are highly significant as well. In total, the four determinants as well as the bank
dummies can explain more than 80% of the variation in the indicator.
The relative importance of three of the four determinants can be assessed by assum-
ing a change in each determinant by one standard deviation. For the LGD, we do not
have a meaningful standard deviation because its variation is exogenously set by us.
Using the standard deviations reported in Table 4.3 and the estimated coefficients in
Table 4.4, we see a decrease of 4.5 in the number of expected failures when the cap-
ital ratio in the system increases by one standard deviation (here: 1.11 percentage
points). The corresponding numbers for interbank lending and entropy are 2.7 and
2.4, respectively. Hence, the capital ratio is the most important determinant. How-
ever, some of the determinants show a rather high correlation among themselves,
which has to be kept in mind when trying to quantify their exact contribution to
system stability.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates interbank contagion due to direct exposures for different
points in time. We have data on mutual interbank exposures from the first quarter
of 2008 to the second quarter of 2011. At first, following Chapter 3, we run conta-
gion simulations by drawing the loss given default from a beta distribution that is
fitted to a distribution of actually realized data of loss given default on the interbank
market. As a result, we obtain for each point in time a whole distribution as well
as the expected number of bank failures. We find that the system has become less
vulnerable to domino effects over time. As a robustness check, we compare these
results with the results obtained assuming a constant LGD and find that for a rather
stable system, the assumption of a constant LGD tends to underestimate the extent
of contagion, whereas for a rather unstable system the assumption of a constant
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LGD tends to overestimate the extent of contagion.
As a next step, we analyze whether the information of the whole distribution of bank
failures can be summarized in a single indicator like the expected number of bank
failures. Using the concept of stochastic dominance to compare the distributions for
different points in time, we find that the discriminatory power of the single indicator
is sufficiently high.
Finally, we investigate the main determinants of this indicator. We find that the
banks’ capital ratio, the share of interbank assets in the system in relation to total
assets, the loss given default and the degree of equality in the distribution of in-
terbank exposures (measured by entropy) are important determinants for financial
stability. We are thus able to confirm the importance of these determinants derived
from theoretical considerations.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Appendix 1: Beta distribution
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Figure 4.7: Different beta distributions of the loss given default used for the con-
tagion simulations
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4.7.2 Appendix 2: Dominance relationships
Analysis of dominance relationships from the first quarter of 2008 (08q1) to the
second quarter of 2011 (11q2). If the element in row x and column y of the matrix
is equal to one, the distribution function of time y (first-order) stochastically domi-
nates the distribution function of time x.

08q1 08q2 08q3 08q4 09q1 09q2 09q3 09q4 10q1 10q2 10q3 10q4 11q1 11q2
08q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
08q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
08q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
08q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
09q1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
09q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
09q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
09q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
10q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
10q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
10q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
10q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
11q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
11q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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